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ABSTRACT  
   
In this dissertation, two interrelated problems of service-based systems 
(SBS) are addressed: protecting users' data confidentiality from service providers, 
and managing performance of multiple workflows in SBS. Current SBSs pose 
serious limitations to protecting users' data confidentiality. Since users' sensitive 
data is sent in unencrypted forms to remote machines owned and operated by 
third-party service providers, there are risks of unauthorized use of the users' 
sensitive data by service providers. Although there are many techniques for 
protecting users' data from outside attackers, currently there is no effective way to 
protect users' sensitive data from service providers. In this dissertation, an 
approach is presented to protecting the confidentiality of users' data from service 
providers, and ensuring that service providers cannot collect users' confidential 
data while the data is processed or stored in cloud computing systems. The 
approach has four major features: (1) separation of software service providers and 
infrastructure service providers, (2) hiding the information of the owners of data, 
(3) data obfuscation, and (4) software module decomposition and distributed 
execution.  
Since the approach to protecting users' data confidentiality includes 
software module decomposition and distributed execution, it is very important to 
effectively allocate the resource of servers in SBS to each of the software module 
to manage the overall performance of workflows in SBS. An approach is 
presented to resource allocation for SBS to adaptively allocating the system 
resources of servers to their software modules in runtime in order to satisfy the 
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performance requirements of multiple workflows in SBS. Experimental results 
show that the dynamic resource allocation approach can substantially increase the 
throughput of a SBS and the optimal resource allocation can be found in 
polynomial time. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
1.1 Background on Service-Based System 
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a computer system model for 
creating and sharing computing processes, packaged as services. Late binding, 
loose coupling, reusability and dynamic composition are major characteristics of 
SOA [1]. In SOA, a service is an independent software or hardware entity with 
well-defined standard interface to provide certain functions over the networks. 
Services are self-contained, stateless, reusable and platform-independent, which 
can be dynamically composed to form a workflow.  
A service-based system (SBS) is a software system based on SOA. SBS is 
developed by invoking and coordinating various services available over networks.  
Although services may be distributed across networks, provided by different 
organizations, implemented with different techniques and executed on different 
platforms, the standardized interfaces and invocation protocols allow SBS 
developers to rapidly compose large-scale distributed software systems from 
existing services [2]. The interactions among services are governed by certain 
contracts, called the Service Level Agreements (SLA). SLA specifies certain 
quality of service (QoS) requirements that the service providers have to meet 
during the run-time of SBS. SBS have attracted much attention from industry and 
academia because they have the major advantage of enabling rapid development 
of various applications ranging from mission critical applications to simple 
commercial applications, including collaborative research and development, e-
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business, health care, grid-enabled applications, enterprise computing 
infrastructures, military applications, and homeland security [3].  With the rapid 
growth of the Internet, SOA and virtualization technologies, SBS leads to the 
vision of “Internet as a supercomputer,” which incorporates the concepts of 
“software as a service”, “platform as a service”, and “infrastructure as a service.”  
 
1.2 Motivation 
Due to the dynamic, loosely coupled, distributed and compositional nature 
of SBSs, managing the quality of service (QoS) of SBS has become a major 
problem. A recent survey [4] shows that most of SBS users are concerned with 
the QoS of the SBS because the services of a SBS run on remote machines owned 
and operated by various third-party providers, which the users do not have any 
control. Hence, fundamental changes to current SBS consideration are needed to 
manage multiple QoS features in SBSs effectively. Among various QoS features 
in SBS, security and performance are two most important QoS features in SBSs 
[5-8]. In the following two subsections, problems of managing security and 
performance in current SBS are discussed. 
 
1.2.1 Managing Security in SBS 
Among the various aspects of security of SBSs, confidentiality protection 
of users’ data in SBSs is one of most serious concerns of SBS users [8]. Although 
there are many studies addressing other security aspects in SBSs, such as integrity, 
trustworthiness, availability and reliability [9-12], currently there is no effective 
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approach for confidentiality protection of user’s data in SBSs from service 
providers [4].  Current SBSs pose serious limitation on protecting users' data 
confidentiality. Since users' sensitive data is processed and stored at remote 
machines owned and operated by service providers, there are risks of 
unauthorized disclosure and tampering of the users' sensitive data by service 
providers. Although there are many techniques for confidentiality protection from 
outside attackers in various computing systems, such as access control, identity 
management, end-to-end data confidentiality and integrity assurance [13-16], 
these techniques cannot be applied to SBSs for confidentiality protection of users’ 
data because they were developed only for protection from malicious parties 
outside the SBSs. Since service providers of SBSs are insiders of SBSs, and their 
threats are considered as inside threats for users’ data confidentiality in SBSs, an 
effective approach to protecting users’ data confidentiality in SBSs from service 
providers is needed.  
 
1.2.2 Managing Performance of SBS 
In a SBS, multiple services in different servers over networks are 
dynamically composed to multiple workflows. Hence, the performance of 
workflows in SBS is determined by the allocated system resources of each server 
to its services during runtime.  Multiple services are often hosted by the same 
server in a SBS and compete for the limited system resources of the server, such 
as CPU-time, memory, and network bandwidth. In addition, service compositions, 
resource status of servers, workflow priorities and QoS requirements are usually 
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dynamically changing in runtime. Hence, it is necessary to have effective 
techniques to adaptively allocate the system resources to each service in a SBS in 
order to satisfy the performance requirements of multiple workflows in the SBS. 
The system resources considered in this dissertation is for a large-scale 
aggregation of dynamically scalable distributed computing resources working 
together over the Internet as a tremendous virtual computer [17-19]. For example, 
computing grids and clouds are vast resource pools for on-demand requests over 
the Internet. In order to allocate resources of such systems effectively, the SBS 
needs to have the capabilities of monitoring the changing resource status, 
analyzing and estimating system performance features, and adapting its resource 
allocation to satisfy the QoS requirements of multiple workflows simultaneously 
in runtime. The following challenges need to be addressed for adaptive resource 
allocation in runtime in a SBS: 
C1) Situation Awareness: A SBS must be aware of changing situations in 
dynamic runtime environments. An efficient and reliable monitoring scheme is 
needed for collecting the relevant contextual data of situation, such as dynamic 
workflow compositions, the number and workload of service-requests for each 
workflow, performance requirements, priorities of workflows, and available 
system resources as well as various relevant environmental attributes.   
C2) Context analysis and performance prediction: A SBS must be able to 
efficiently analyze the relationship between allocation of available resources and 
performance of workflows. An automated analysis of the monitored context data 
should generate good estimates of the expected QoS of workflows.  
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C3) Satisfying users’ requirements: A SBS must be able to efficiently determine 
in runtime whether a resource allocation will satisfy the performance 
requirements of multiple workflows with dynamic situations. If some of the 
performance requirements of workflows cannot be satisfied, then the SBS must be 
able to adaptively adjust the performance of some workflows according the 
workflow priorities and agreements pre-defined by users. 
C4) Resource adaptation: Once proper resource allocation is determined, SBS 
must be able to adaptively change the resource allocation to its services in runtime.  
C5) Efficiency and scalability: The processes of collecting and analyzing 
contextual data to determine resource allocation and adapting resource allocation 
must be efficient and scalable 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 Develop an approach to protecting the confidentiality of users' data from 
service providers in SBSs.  This approach should satisfy the following three 
goals:  (1) Service users should be able to specify certain sensitive data not to 
be shared with their service providers, and make sure that the specified 
sensitive data is not disclosed to or tampered by their service providers even if 
there is no cooperation from their service providers. (2) The approach should 
not depend on the trust relationship among users and service providers 
because the trust relationship may dynamically change (3) The overhead of 
using this approach should not significantly degrade the overall performance 
of the SBS.  
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 Develop a resource allocation approach to adaptively allocating the system 
resources of servers to their services in runtime to satisfy users’ performance 
requirements of multiple workflows in a SBS.  
 
1.4 Presentation of this Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows: 
The background and related research of the confidentiality protection of 
users’ data and resource allocation in SBS will be discussed in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3, the overall approach to protecting confidentiality of users’ data from 
service providers in SBS will be presented. One of the important features of this 
approach is to use data obfuscation, which will be discussed in Chapter 4. this 
approach will also use anonymous access to SBS by users, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will present techniques for software module 
decomposition and distributed execution to protect users’ data confidentiality 
from service providers.  In Chapter 7, the overall approach to adaptive resource 
allocation for SBSs will be presented. This approach will model the relationship 
between resource allocations and performance of workflows in the SBS and then 
use linear programming to determine resource allocation to satisfy users’ 
requirements on performance of each workflow. Finally, a summary of the 
contributions presented in the dissertation and future research will be presented in 
Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CURRENT STATE OF ART 
In this chapter, the background information and existing research efforts 
related to the confidentiality protection of users’ data in SBS and resource 
allocation in SBS are discussed. 
 
2.1 Confidentiality Protection of User’s Data in SBS 
There are three types of problems in protection confidentiality of user’s 
data in SBS. The first problem is the disclosure of sensitive private information 
when exchanging data through the services. And the sensitive private information 
includes: personally identifiable information, usage data, unique device identities 
and so on. The second problem is that people getting inappropriate or 
unauthorized access to personal data in the SBS by taking advantage of certain 
vulnerabilities, such as lack of access control enforcement, security holes and so 
on [20]. The third problem is that: because the feature of SBS is that it is a 
dynamic environment, in those service interactions can be created in a more 
dynamic way than traditional e-commerce scenarios [21]. Services can potentially 
be aggregated and changed dynamically by service providers can change the 
provisioning of services. In such scenarios, personal sensitive data may move 
around within an organization or across organizational boundaries, so adequate 
protection of this information must be maintained despite the changes. So design 
the method to protect the privacy in SBS computing must meet the dynamical 
exchange of data. 
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An approach to protecting users’ data privacy using client-based privacy 
management in SBS was presented in [22]. In this approach, users can manage the 
privacy of their data in SBS through data obfuscation, privacy policy settings, 
auditing and monitoring of personal data in SBS. Those features are implemented 
as a client-side component rather than leaving them to be implemented entirely on 
the server side.  The proposed approach can provide a user-centric trust model 
that helps users to control their sensitive information in SBS. However the 
proposed approach requires corresponding server-side components for effective 
operation, and hence requires some cooperation from the service provider in SBS. 
If there is no cooperation from service provider, this approach may not be 
effective to protect users’ sensitive data. In addition, if the service provider is 
malicious, this approach cannot protect confidentiality of users’ data in SBS from 
service providers because the service providers will have full access privilege to 
users’ data in SBS. 
An approach for managing identities in SBS that enables individual users 
to easily manage their own online identities and to effortlessly participate in 
online collaboration activities without repeated sign-on were introduced [23]. 
Using the identity service (or two or more different ones), users have control over 
who has their personal data and how it is used-minimizing the risk of identity 
theft and fraud. This identity service can help users manage their pseudo identities 
in order to hide real identity and the information about the owner of data in SBS. 
Some storage-as-a service providers, such as JungleDisk, Amazon S3 and 
Mozy, encrypt data files with a key stored only on the user’s machine. Storage-as-
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a-service with no personalization can use data files encrypted in such a way that 
no one but the user can decrypt them (in particular, service providers cannot 
decrypt them). However, services which process or use some items of the data 
cannot use such encrypted files as input. Some such services may process input 
data that had been obfuscated using Voltage’s Format-Preserving Encryption [24]. 
This encrypts specific data fields while retaining the format of data records, and 
preserving referential integrity. Similarly, TC3 Health Inc.’s HIPAA-compliant 
software pseudonymizes sensitive items before processing data using SBS [25]. 
However, it appears that services which calculate the sum of several data entries 
cannot use data encrypted using these methods as input. Hence these methods are 
not sufficient to deal with the database queries. 
 
2.2 Resource Allocation in SBS 
Development of QoS and resource management middleware has been 
studied in various research areas, such as real-time systems, distributed object-
oriented systems, web services, grid computing and SBS computing. A workflow-
based computational resource broker [26, 27] is presented for grid computing 
environment. The main function of the resource broker is to monitor the available 
resources and match workflow requirements to available resources over multiple 
administrative domains. The resource broker provides a uniform interface for 
accessing available system resources of computing grid via users’ credentials. An 
open-source toolkit Globus has emerged as a standard middleware for resource 
management in grid computing environment [28]. Globus provides Web Service 
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Grid Resource Allocation and Management (WS GRAM) Protocol in which a set 
of web services are designed to support APIs for requesting and using grid system 
resources. Globus also provides Monitoring and Discovery Service (MDS) that 
supports a common interface for collecting contextual information on system 
resources, such as available processors, CPU load, network bandwidth, file 
system information, storage devices, and memory in computing grids.  
A market-based autonomic resource management approach in SBS 
computing environment was developed [29], in which Service-Level Agreement 
Resource Allocator provides the interfaces between the SBS service provider and 
external users/brokers for 1) monitoring users’ service requests and QoS 
requirements, 2) monitoring the availability of system resources, 3) examining 
service requests to determine whether to accept the requests according to resource 
availability and processing workload, 4) allocating system resources to VMs in 
SBS, 5) pricing the usage of resources and prioritizing the resource allocation, and 
6) keeping track of the execution progress of the service requests and maintaining 
the actual usage of resources. This approach supports negotiation of QoS between 
users and providers to establish service-level agreements (SLA) and allocation of 
system resources to meet the SLAs. 
    Multi-layered resource management (MLRM) architecture using standard-
based middleware technology [30] was developed for enterprise distributed real-
time embedded (DRE) systems. This architecture supports dynamic resource 
management to optimize and reconfigure system resources at runtime in response 
to changing mission needs and resource status. With the dynamic resource 
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allocation, a DRE system can provide QoS for critical operations under the 
overloaded and resource constrained environments. In [31], a constraint-
programming-based approach is presented to solve resource allocation problem in 
real-time systems. The problem of assigning a set of preemptive real-time tasks in 
a distributed system is formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) with 
allocation, resource and timing constraints. First, the CSP is solved using 
constraint programming techniques to satisfy the allocation and resource 
constraints. Then, the solution is validated for timing constraints through Logic-
based Benders decomposition [32].   
    In [33], a decentralized local greedy mechanism for dynamic resource 
allocation in web service applications was presented.  In this mechanism, software 
agents are generated to buy and sell network services and resources to and from 
each other. In [34], a market based resource allocation for web services in a 
commercial environment was presented. In this approach, service providers 
employ a cluster of servers to host web services, and service consumers pay for 
service usage with QoS requirements, such as waiting time or response time. A 
framework was developed for evaluating the effect of particular resource 
allocation in terms of performance and average revenue earned per unit time. A 
heuristic algorithm was also developed for making resource allocation decisions 
in order to maximize revenue. 
    The QoS of networks has been investigated for providing prioritized 
services by efficient resource allocation techniques through labeling, scheduling 
and routing mechanisms. In [35], an optimal resource allocation and pricing 
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scheme for next generation multiclass networks was presented. In this scheme, an 
optimization problem is formulated based on a nonlinear pricing model, whose 
solution ensures satisfaction of network delay constraints and efficient resource 
allocation in dynamic multiservice networks. In [36], an energy-efficient radio 
resource allocation approach based on game theory for wireless networks was 
presented. The study shows that the game-theoretic approach for resource 
allocation is useful for energy-constrained wireless networks. In [37], a resource 
allocation scheme for the wireless multimedia applications was presented. In this 
scheme, an optimization problem is formulated with fairness constraints for 
maximizing system capacity and resource utilization.  The solution of this 
problem yields the optimal allocation of sub-channel, path and power. A heuristic 
algorithm to solve the optimization problem was also presented to ensure that the 
adaptive resource allocation is performed efficiently in runtime. In [38], an 
approach to allocating resources for embedded multimedia systems using 
heterogeneous multiprocessors were presented, in which optimal resources are 
allocated to each application to meet its throughput requirement. Synchronous 
Dataflow Graphs (SDFG) are used to model multimedia applications with time 
and resource constraints and to find the optimal resource allocation. 
QoS estimation according to the system activities and resource status has 
been studied in many ways. A QoS model of a router with feedback control that 
monitors the state of resource usage and adaptively adjusts parameters of traffic 
admission control to estimate QoS and resource utilization was presented in [39]. 
Batch Scheduled Admission Control (BSAC) method to predict service delay for 
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high priority jobs in Internet-type networks was presented in [40]. A regression-
based model for dynamically provisioning resource demand to deliver given QoS 
expectation was presented in [41].  An adaptive model for the tradeoff between 
service performance and security in service-based environments was presented in 
[42]. This model can be used to adjust security configurations to provide 
sufficient protection and satisfy service performance requirements with limited 
system resources. 
For adaptive resource allocation for QoS management in SBS, application 
level differentiated services [43, 44] were introduced to control QoS for different 
classes of service consumers. When the system resources are limited, fewer 
resources are allocated for normal consumers, and most resources are reserved for 
satisfying premium consumers’ expected QoS. Feedback controlled web services 
[45, 46] were developed to adjust QoS to meet the most important performance 
when resources are limited and consumers’ required performance cannot be fully 
satisfied. In [47], an integrated QoS management approach in SBS in order to 
satisfy user’s QoS requirements by providing differentiated system resources and 
priority of workflows was presented. In [48, 49], a general methodology for 
developing SBS with QoS monitoring and adaptation was introduced. This 
methodology supports monitoring of the changing system status, analysis and 
control of tradeoffs among multiple QoS features, and adapting its service 
configuration to satisfy multiple QoS requirements simultaneously. 
    Existing resource allocation approaches cannot support dynamically 
changing runtime environments in SBS, such as workflow composition, QoS 
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requirements, workflow priorities and resource status. Hence, a new approach to 
dynamic resource allocation for SBS is needed to address the challenges 
discussed in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OVERALL APPROACH TO PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY OF USER 
DATA IN SBS 
In this Chapter, the overall approach to protecting confidentiality of users’ 
data from service providers in SBS will be presented. This approach has the 
following goals:  
 Service users can make sure that their sensitive data, which the users specify 
not to be shared with their service providers, is not disclosed to their service 
providers even if there is no cooperation from their service providers 
 The protection of users’ confidential data does not depend on dynamic trust 
relationship among users and service providers. 
 This approach does not cause much overhead on service performance. 
 
3.1 Protection of Users’ Data Confidentiality from Service Providers in SBS 
In [50], confidentiality is defined as the assurance that sensitive information 
is not disclosed to unauthorized persons, processes, or devices. Hence, the users’ 
confidential data, which the users do not want to be accessed by service providers 
should not be disclosed to service providers in SBS, including applications, 
platforms, CPU and physical memories.  
It is noted that users’ confidential data is disclosed to a service provider only 
if all of the following two conditions are satisfied simultaneously:  
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Condition 1) The service provider knows where the users’ confidential data is 
located in SBS and has the privilege to access and collect the users’ confidential 
data in SBS. 
Condition 2) The service provider can understand the meaning of the users’ data.  
This is due to the following reasons: In order to collect users’ data, the 
service provider must know the location of the data in SBS and have the privilege 
to access the data.  Even if the service provider can collect users’ data successfully, 
the service provider may not be able to understand the meaning of the data unless 
the service provider has at the least some of the following information to 
understand the meanings of the data: 
• Types of data 
• Functionalities and interfaces of the application using the data 
• Format of the data 
Hence, if a SBS can prevent the service providers from satisfying all the above 
two conditions, the SBS can protect the confidentiality of users’ data in SBS from 
the service providers. 
 
3.2 Problems with the Current SBS Architecture 
The current SBS consists of three layers: software layer, platform layer and 
infrastructure layer, as shown in Figure 1. The software layer provides the 
interfaces for users to use service provider’s applications. The platform layer 
provides the operating environment for the software to run using system resources. 
The infrastructure layer provides the hardware resources for computing, storage, 
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and networks. Platforms or infrastructures can be provided as virtual machines.  
The following are the major problems of current SBS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Each service provider has its own software layer, platform layer and 
infrastructure layer. When a user uses a SBS application from a service 
provider, the user is forced to use the platform and infrastructure provided by 
the same service provider, and hence the service provider knows where the 
users’ data is located and has full access privileges to the data. 
 The user is forced to use the interfaces provided by the service provider, and 
users’ data has to be in a fixed format specified by the service provider, and 
hence the service provider knows all the information required for 
understanding users’ data.  
Therefore, current SBSs cannot prevent service providers from satisfying all of 
the two conditions. 
 
Figure 1:  Current Architecture of SBS 
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3.3 Overall Approach for User’s Data Confidentiality Protection in Service-Based 
Systems 
 
 
The overall approach for user’s data confidentiality protection in SBSs can be 
depicted in Figure 2. This approach has the following seven entities to protect the 
confidentiality of users’ data processed and stored in a SBS: software SBS, 
infrastructure SBS, software service broker, infrastructure service broker, software 
service attestation authority, data obfuscator and data de-obfuscator [51]. The 
software SBS and infrastructure SBS have the same features of the software layer 
in the ordinary SBS architecture. However, in this approach, the software layer 
and infrastructure layer are managed by different service providers. The software 
Figure 2: Overall Approach to Protecting Confidentiality of Users’ Data in SBS 
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service brokers and infrastructure service brokers have the same functionality of 
the service brokers in SOA, but they have the additional function for identity-
anonymization. This approach also has the additional three entities, software 
service attestation authority, data obfuscator and data de-obfuscator, for protecting 
the users’ data confidentiality.  This approach will make sure that none of these 
entities in SBS will satisfy the two conditions simultaneously in Section 3.1. The 
description of each of these entities is as follows: 
 Software SBS:  A Software SBS provides the software as a service upon users’ 
requests. Each software SBS may contain multiple software services, and each 
software service can be discovered and accessed by users through Software 
Service Broker. An authenticated user with proper credentials [52] can request 
and acquire a service instance from the software SBS. A service instance is a 
piece of compiled executable code. The executable code can be deployed and 
run on any Infrastructure SBS. In order to protect the intellectual property of 
the software, the code is compiled using various code obfuscation 
technologies [53, 54] so that reverse engineering on the service instance is 
computationally infeasible. This implies that infrastructure service providers 
cannot understand the functionality and algorithms of the service instance by 
examining at the code when the service instance is running on Infrastructure 
SBS.  
 Infrastructure SBS:  An Infrastructure SBS provides virtualized system 
resources, such as CPU, memory, and network resources. An authenticated 
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user can request a virtual machine on which the user can deploy any platform 
or operating system to execute a software service instance.  
 Software Service Broker: A Software Service Broker has two major functions. 
First, it helps users automatically discover and access available software 
services. Second, it helps users hide their identities from software SBS service 
providers. A Software Service Broker provides identity anonymization service, 
by which users can use pseudonyms instead of their true identities so that the 
users can acquire service instances without revealing their identities. The 
anonymization of user identities is very important for protecting the 
confidentiality of users’ data because the information about the data owners 
may reveal a lot of sensitive information regarding the data.  
 Infrastructure Service Broker:  An Infrastructure Service Broker has two 
major functions similar to a Software Service Broker. It helps users 
automatically discover and use available infrastructure services. It also 
provides identity anonymization service to prevent the system from revealing 
users’ true identities. 
 The Software Service Attestation Authority (SSAA):  The SSAA is a third 
party authority to verify that a service instance does not perform any 
malicious activity that may disclose users’ confidential data. For example, a 
software service developer may have injected a hidden function on the 
software service which transmits user’s confidential data to an unauthorized 
third party during its processing without the user’s consent. Since users do not 
know whether a service instance will act as described in the service 
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description, the SSAA needs to help users test the service instance before 
users using it. When a service instance is deployed on the Service Testing 
Platform of SSAA, the SSAA tests whether the service instance performs 
exactly what the service provider claims, and whether the service instance 
may transmit users’ data to any unauthorized entity. 
The testing can be done by i) verifying whether the service instance satisfies 
the web service description language (WSDL) specification of the service, and 
ii) monitoring all the network traffics the software service produces during its 
processing. An approach to automated web service testing based on syntactic 
and semantic analysis of WSDL specification was presented in [55]. After 
completing the testing of the service instance, SSAA issues a digital certificate 
for the tested service instance. A certificate is attached to the service instance 
so that users will know whether the service instance has passed the SSAA’s 
testing. 
 Data Obfuscator: A Data Obfuscator is a middleware provided by a user that 
can be deployed on a virtual machine in an Infrastructure SBS. The service 
instance in an Infrastructure SBS can use system resources only through the 
interfaces of the Data Obfuscator. The Data Obfuscator consists of two 
modules: user-side obfuscator and server-side obfuscator. The two modules 
work together to provide the following security functionality to ensure that 
users’ confidential data is not disclosed to infrastructure service providers: 
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i) Sets up an encryption key with the user. The key is chosen by the user and 
not revealed to any process, platform or device of the SBS computing 
system. 
ii) Encrypts any data being stored in the physical storage of the SBS 
computing system or being transmitted through the network. 
iii) Obfuscates users’ sensitive data being processed in the service instances. 
The obfuscated data cannot be de-obfuscated in the platforms or physical 
devices of an Infrastructure SBS so that its infrastructure provider cannot 
understand the meaning of the users’ sensitive data. The details of the data 
obfuscation will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Data De-obfuscator: A Data De-obfuscator de-obfuscates obfuscated data so 
that a user can see the plain data. A Data De-obfuscator remains in the user’s 
personal computer all the time.  
This approach will have the following four features to protect confidentiality of 
users’ data: 1) separation of software service providers and infrastructure service 
providers in SBS, 2) anonymous access to SBS by users, 3) data obfuscation and 
4) software module decomposition and distributed execution of the modules in 
distinct infrastructures of service providers. With these four features, this 
approach can ensure that at least one of the two conditions in Section 3.1 is not 
satisfied in each of the seven entities in SBS computing system due to the 
following reasons:  
 Although a software service provider knows the functionality of a service 
instance and the data format of users’ input and can satisfy Condition 2), since 
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software service instances are deployed to Infrastructure SBS through its 
Software Service Broker and Infrastructure Service Broker, the software 
service provider does not know where users’ data is located, and does not have 
the privilege to access the data. Thus, the software service provider cannot 
satisfy Condition 1). 
 Although an infrastructure service provider knows the locations of users’ 
specific confidential data and has the privilege to access the data being 
processed and stored in the infrastructure SBS,  the infrastructure service 
provider cannot understand the meaning of the data because i) he/she does not 
know the functionality of the deployed software instance and the format of the 
users’ specific confidential data, ii) the deployed software instance cannot be 
reverse-engineered, iii) the infrastructure service provider does not know the 
identity of the data owners, and iv) the users’ specific confidential data is 
obfuscated while processed and stored in the infrastructure. Hence, the 
infrastructure service provider cannot satisfy Condition 2).  
 Because the Software Service Broker does not know where users’ data is 
located, and does not have the privilege to access user’s data, the Software 
Service Broker cannot satisfy Condition 1).    
 Because an Infrastructure Service Broker does not know the functionality of 
deployed software instance, the data format of user’s data, and does not have 
the privilege to access the data, the Infrastructure Service Broker cannot 
satisfy Condition 1). 
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Overall approach is depicted in Figure 2, where the numbers are 
corresponding to the steps.  It can be summarized as follows: 
An Approach for Protecting Users’ Data Confidentiality in SBS 
S1)  a) A user requests any Software Service Broker to find a software service by 
providing the specification of the software service [56]. b) The Software Service 
Broker performs automatic service discovery [57] to find a service instance in the 
Software SBS that satisfies the user’s requested service requirement specification. 
c) The Software Service Broker acquires the discovered software instance using 
an anonymous credential [58]. 
S2) a) The Software Service Broker deploys the acquired service instance to the 
testing platform of a SSAA. The SSAA verifies whether the service instance 
performs according to its description, and the service instance does not transmit 
users’ specific confidential data to any unauthorized entity. b) After the 
verification procedure, the software service instance is sent back to the Software 
Service Broker. 
S3) a) The user asks the Infrastructure Service Broker to find an infrastructure 
service compatible to the service instance. b) The Infrastructure Service Broker 
discovers an infrastructure service provider, who has the capability to execute the 
acquired software service instance. 
S4) The user requests the infrastructure service provider to set up a virtual 
machine and then deploys the Data Obfuscator on the virtual machine using the 
Agent Deployment Plans (ADPs), for automated middleware deployment and 
migration in service-based systems according to [59]. 
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S5) a) The service instance acquired in S1) is sent to the Infrastructure Service 
Broker. b) The service instance is deployed on the workflow of the Data 
Obfuscator set up in S4).  
S6) a) The user obfuscates his/her data using the user-side data obfuscator b) The 
user sends his/her obfuscated data to the workflow to process. During the 
processing of users’ input data, the user’s specific confidential data is obfuscated 
so that the infrastructure service provider cannot understand the meaning of user’s 
data. c) After completing the processing, the processed data is sent to the user. d) 
The processed data is de-obfuscated to plain data in the user’s computer. 
 
The details of the data obfuscation will be discussed in Chapter 4. Details 
on the anonymization of users’ identities will be discussed in Chapter 5.  Details 
on the partitioning users’ data set and controlling the data flows in SBS will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. Details on the resource allocation for manage performance 
requirements of multiple workflows will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA OBFUSCATION 
Data obfuscation is the process of transforming the format or structure of 
data to hide the meaning of data. The major difference between encryption and 
obfuscation is that encrypted data cannot be processed until it is decrypted, but 
obfuscated data can be processed without de-obfuscation. Data obfuscation is 
used to process users’ data in an infrastructure SBS without revealing any users’ 
specific confidential data to the infrastructure service providers.  
The general algebraic description of data obfuscation is as follows. 
Suppose a user wishes to use an infrastructure SBS service to process a function F 
on the user’s input x without revealing the meaning of x to the infrastructure 
service provider. Obfuscation function O and de-obfuscation function D have 
following properties: 
 D(F(O(x, k), k) = F(x), where k is an obfuscation key  
 The infrastructure service provider cannot understand the meaning of x by 
examining O(x, k) 
 D or k cannot be derived from O 
 O(x, k) and D(F(O(x, k), k) can be calculated in polynomial time 
 
4.1 An Approach to Data Obfuscation 
When a data obfuscator is deployed by a user on a virtual machine in the 
Infrastructure SBS, the data obfuscator obfuscates the user’s input data x using 
one of the following three methods:  
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Method A) Take dummy input data from a user and generate arbitrary 
dummy outputs. In this approach, a user’s input data is entered to a software 
service instance through the data obfuscator. Since the infrastructure service 
provider does not know the input data format of the service instance, the data 
obfuscator can take any number of dummy input data from the users. Only the 
user’s inputs to be processed are given to the software service instance, and the 
data obfuscator generates arbitrary dummy outputs on the user’s dummy inputs. 
The outputs generated by the service instance from the user’s inputs, and the 
dummy outputs generated from the user’s dummy inputs by the data obfuscator 
are mixed and encrypted together, and sent back to the user. The dummy outputs 
are marked so that data de-obfuscator in the user’s computer can recognize the 
dummy outputs after the all the outputs of the service instance are decrypted.  
For example, given user’s input data x, a software service function F and a 
secret integer key k, O(x, k) generates dummy input data a1, a2… an, where n > k. 
For each dummy input data generated, the data obfuscator processes dummy 
functions f1(a1), f2(a2)…fn(an) while the software service instance processes F(x).  
Then, an array of output data (f1(a1), f2(a2)… fk-1(ak-1), F(x), fk(ak),…,fn(an)) is 
sent to the user. The data-de-obfuscator at the user’s computer de-obfuscates the 
array of output data using the secret key k. Hence, D((f1(a1), f2(a2)… fk-1(ak-1), 
F(x), fk(ak),…, fn(an)) = F(x). 
 
Method B) Use a file system not known to all the infrastructure providers. A 
file system is a method of storing and organizing files and data into computer 
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memories and storage devices, such as hard disks or CD-ROMs. If an 
infrastructure service provider can understand the file system structure of a user’s 
operating system running on the infrastructure SBS, the service provider may be 
able to locate and extract users’ data from memories or storage devices. Data 
obfuscator uses a file system which is not known to any of the infrastructure 
providers so that the infrastructure service providers cannot extract meaningful 
data from the memory or storage devices of the SBS computing system.  
For example, data obfuscator can change the number of disk sectors in a 
cluster or the format of the file allocation table in the file system so that the 
infrastructure service provider cannot understand the file system structure.  In 
order to prevent the service providers from extracting the users’ specific 
confidential data from network traffics, the user’s specific confidential data 
should be encrypted in the user’s computer before being sent to service provider’s 
infrastructure. The encrypted data is decrypted and processed on the data 
obfuscator’s file system. 
 
Method C) Transform users’ input data. Data obfuscator transforms the format 
or value of users’ input data so that the infrastructure service provider cannot 
understand the meaning of the data. All the operations associated with the original 
data must also be applicable to the transformed data so that the software service 
instance is able to process the obfuscated data.  
For example, the data obfuscator transforms a regular string encoded with 
ASCII code into a different string format using a secret string encoder. Then, the 
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string encoded with the secret string encoder must support all the operations 
associated with string data, such as concatenation, split, length calculation, 
comparison, uppercase, lowercase or  character replacement. 
The general algebraic description of data transformation for obfuscation is as 
follows. Given input data x, a set of associated operations{P1,…, Pn}, an 
obfuscation function O, a secret key k, and de-obfuscation function D: 
Pi(x) = D(Pi(O(x,k)),k), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n 
Both numerical data and text data can be obfuscated using the data 
transformation method.  
 For numeric data, an arithmetic operation is performed on user’s input data 
with secret integer k to transform the value of the data.  
For example, suppose a user wish to process a function F(a,b) = a + b, where 
a and b are integer values, in an Infrastructure SBS without revealing the 
value of a and b to the infrastructure service provider. In order to obfuscate a 
and b, both a and b are multiplied by k. Then F(ak,bk) = (ak + bk) is 
processed in the infrastructure SBS. The infrastructure service provider cannot 
find the value of a and b without knowing k. The user can de-obfuscate (ak + 
bk) by dividing it by k and then get the value of a + b.  Table1 shows 
obfuscation and de-obfuscation functions for each arithmetic operation for 
numeric data. 
 
 
 
  30 
Table 1: Obfuscation and De-obfuscation Functions for Arithmetic Operations  
Operation User 
input 
Obfuscation 
function 
Obfuscated 
data 
De-
obfuscation 
function 
De-
obfuscated 
data 
Addition a , b O(x,k) = xk ak, bk D(x,k) = x/k a + b 
Subtraction a , b O(x,k) = xk ak, bk D(x,k) = x/k a – b 
Multiplication a , b O(x,k) = xk ak, bk D(x,k) = x/k
2
 a * b 
Division a , b O(x,k) = x
k
 a
k
, b
k
 D(x,k) =  𝒙
𝒌
 a / b 
 
 
 For text data, a secret encoder is used to transform the format of the text data. 
A secret encoder can be generated by randomly shuffling the order of a 
standard text encoding table, such as ASCII code table. Once a secret encoder 
is generated by a user, the data obfuscator transforms each character of the 
user’s text data using the secret encoder. Since the transformation is done 
character by character, any operation associated with original text data can be 
applied to the transformed data. After the transformed text data is processed in 
the infrastructure SBS, the data is sent to the user and de-obfuscated in the 
user’s computer. During the de-obfuscation, each character of the transformed 
text data is mapped to the original ASCII code. 
For example, suppose a user wants to concatenate two strings “ab” and 
“cd” in an infrastructure SBS. The user generates a secret encoder by 
randomly shuffling the ASCII code table. Table2 shows the standard ASCII 
code and an example of secret code generated by the user. Data obfuscator 
transforms “ab” and “cd” to “0111101100100111” and “1011000001111011” 
respectively using the secret code. The transformed strings are concatenated 
into “01111011001001111011000001111011” in the infrastructure SBS and 
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sent to the user. Data de-obfuscator in the user’s computer performs the 
mapping of the transformed text data to the original ASCII code so that the 
de-obfuscated data is mapped to “01100001011000100110001101100100”, 
which means “abcd” in the original ASCII code.  
Table 2: Standard ASCII Code and a Secret Code Generated by User 
Character Standard ASCII code 
A secret code 
generated by user 
a 01100001 01111011 
b 01100010 00100111 
c 01100011 10110000 
d 01100100 01111011 
 
ASCII code has 127 characters in its encoding table, and each character is 
represented by an 8-bits binary number. By shuffling the order of the 127 
characters in the table, the factorial of 127 (≈ 3 * 10213) secret encoding tables can 
be generated. Thus, it is computationally infeasible for infrastructure service 
providers to find the meaning of the transformed text data using brute forcing 
attack. 
Methods A) and C) are used for obfuscating and de-obfuscating users’ 
specific confidential data during the data processing time. Method C) is suitable 
for processing numerical and text data, and method A) is suitable for other types 
of data, such as image and video data. Method B) is used for obfuscating and de-
obfuscating any types of data during the storing time.   
 
4.2 An Illustrative Example  
This section presents an example to illustrate how my approach can protect 
users’ specific confidential data in SBS computing systems. 
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Consider a group of users in different locations, who would like to have an 
online conference using SBS computing shown in Figure 3. They must be able to 
communicate with each other through voice, video, and/or instance messaging. 
They also need to share files with each other. To achieve this, they need to use the 
five services: Voice Communication Service, Video Communication Service, File 
Sharing Service, Instant Messaging Service, and Conference Controller. Since the 
voice data, video data, messages, or files may contain the specific confidential 
information which the users do not want the service providers to know, the users 
require the protection of such specific confidential data from the service providers. 
The virtual machine for online conferencing can be set up according to my 
approach as follows:  
 
 
S1) i) The leader of the group requests a Software Service Broker to find the five 
software services: Voice Communication Service, Video Communication Service, 
Figure 3:  An Example of Online Video Conferencing 
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File Sharing Service, Instant Messaging Service and Conference Controller. ii) 
The Software Service Broker discovers the services. iii) The Software Service 
Broker downloads the service instances of the five software services.  
S2) i) The Software Service Broker deploys the service instances to the testing 
platform of an SSAA. ii) The SSAA verifies the software service instances. 
S3) i) The leader of the group requests an Infrastructure Service Broker to find an 
infrastructure service compatible to the service instances. ii) The Infrastructure 
Service Broker discovers an infrastructure service. 
S4) A virtual machine is set up in the Infrastructure SBS. The leader of the group 
deploys the Data Obfuscator on the virtual machine. Obfuscation keys and 
encryption keys unknown to infrastructure service providers are sent to all other 
users.  
S5) i) The service instances are sent to the Infrastructure Service Broker. ii) The 
service instances are deployed on the Data Obfuscator. The five service instances 
are composed to a workflow. The workflow provides all the functionality for 
online conferencing. 
S6) i) The users of the group send their input data to the workflow to process. 
During the processing of the users’ input data, the users’ specific confidential 
input data is obfuscated. After completing the processing, a service response of 
the workflow is sent to all the users of the group that the processing of their input 
data has been completed. ii) The service response of the users’ specific 
confidential input data is de-obfuscated. 
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The data obfuscation during the online conferencing is done as follows: 
 All users’ names are transformed to pseudonyms in the Infrastructure SBS. 
The pseudonyms are de- obfuscated to the plain names in users’ personal 
computers. 
 All users’ voice data is transformed using a secret audio encoder.  
 All users’ video data is transformed using a secret video encoder.  
 All users’ text messages are transformed using a secret string encoder. 
 Dummy input data is generated frequently and sent to all the users.  
 
In this example, at least one of the two conditions in Section 3.1 is not 
satisfied in each entity in the SBS computing system due to the following reasons:  
 Software service providers do not know where users’ data is located, and do 
not have the privilege to access the data. Hence, Condition 1) cannot be 
satisfied by the software service providers  
 The infrastructure service provider cannot understand the meaning of users’ 
specific confidential input data because i) the infrastructure service provider 
does not know the functionality of the deployed software instances and the 
data formats of the users’ specific confidential input data, ii) the deployed 
software instance cannot be reverse-engineered, iii) the infrastructure service 
provider does not know the identities of the data owners, and iv) users’ 
specific confidential input data is obfuscated. Hence, Condition 2) cannot be 
satisfied by the infrastructure service provider. 
 The Software Service Broker does not know where users’ data is located, and 
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does not have the privilege to access the data. Hence, Condition 1) cannot be 
satisfied by the Software Service Broker. 
 The Infrastructure Service Broker does not know the functionality of the 
deployed software instances, the format of users’ specific confidential input 
data, and does not have the privilege to access such data. Hence, Conditions 1) 
and 2) cannot be satisfied by the Infrastructure Service Broker. 
Hence, the confidentiality of users’ specific confidential data is protected in this 
example. 
 
4.3 An Experiment on Performance of Data Obfuscator and Data De-obfuscator 
I implemented a SBS service using C# Microsoft .NET framework for 
collaborative online documentation. Using this SBS service, multiple users can 
collaboratively create and edit a document within a SBS computing system. Since 
the document may contain confidential information, the SBS service provider 
must not be able to understand the meaning of the document while the document 
is processed in the SBS computing system.  
I also implemented Method C) of Data Obfuscator and De-obfuscator 
discussed in Section 4.1. A virtual machine was set up using Microsoft Hyper-V 
Manager 6.0, which had 0.7 GHZ CPU, 256 MB memory and Windows Server 
2003OS.  The collaborative online documentation SBS service and data 
obfuscator are deployed on the virtual machine, and the data De-obfuscator is 
deployed on the user’s computer as shown in Figure 4. 
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In order to measure the performance of Method C) of data obfuscator and de-
obfuscator, I ran two sets of experiments. In both sets of experiments, a set of 
input texts with various sizes are sent to the SBS service for processing and the 
service response time for each input was measured. In the first set of experiments, 
I used the SBS service without using the Data Obfuscator and De-obfuscator. In 
the second set of experiments, I used the SBS service along with Method C) of 
Data Obfuscator and De-obfuscator. 100% of the users’ input text was specified as 
confidential data so that all of the input data is obfuscated and de-obfuscated 
during the service processing. The measured service response time for each set of 
experiment is shown in Figure 5. 
Experimental result shows that the service response time always increases 
linearly as the size of the input text increases in both sets of experiments.  This 
means that the additional overhead for data obfuscation and de-obfuscation 
appears to be proportional to the size of the input text specified as confidential. 
Hence, data obfuscation and de-obfuscation methods can perform in polynomial 
Figure 4:  Collaborative Online Documentation Service with Data Obfuscator 
and De-obfuscator 
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time and scalable. In this approach, performing data obfuscation and de-
obfuscation is the steps producing most overhead. Since the experimental results 
show that the data obfuscation and de-obfuscation do not cause much overhead, 
and hence my approach has reasonable performance. 
 
4.4 Security Evaluation of Data Obfuscation Methods 
 In this section, security evaluation of each data obfuscation method 
described in Section 4.1 is presented. The strengths of confidentiality protection 
provided by the obfuscation methods are measured based on two properties, 
difficulty of reverse-engineering the obfuscated data [60] and the resemblance of 
the obfuscated data with the original data [61].  
 Evaluation of Method A)  
Figure 5: Service Response Time of Collaborative Online Documentation 
Service with Various Sizes of Input Texts 
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Given obfuscation function O, de-obfuscation function D, user’s input data x, 
a function F and a secret integer key k, O(x, k) generates dummy input data a1, 
a2… an, where n > k. For each dummy input data generated, the data 
obfuscator processes dummy functions f1(a1), f2(a2)…fn(an) while the 
software service instance processes F(x).  Then, an array of output data (f1(a1), 
f2(a2)… fk-1(ak-1), F(x), fk(ak),…,fn(an)) is sent to the user. The data-de-
obfuscator at the user’s computer de-obfuscates the array of output data using 
the secret key k. Hence, D((f1(a1), f2(a2)… fk-1(ak-1), F(x), fk(ak),…, fn(an)) = 
F(x).  
In this method, randomized noise to the original data provides non-
resemblance of the obfuscated data. Let size of x is S(x) and size of ai is S(ai), 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the resemblance of the obfuscated data {x, a1, a2… an } 
is measured by  
𝑺(𝒙)
𝑺 𝒙 + 𝑺 𝒂𝒊 
 . The difficulty of reverse engineering increases 
when n increases. Let the time needed for reverse engineering function fi is 
T(fi), where1 ≤ i ≤ n .  Then the difficulty of the reverse engineering is 
measured by  
𝑻 𝑭 𝒙  + 𝑻(𝒇𝒊(𝒂𝒊))
𝑻(𝑭(𝒙))
. Users can adaptively increase the strength 
of confidentiality protection by increasing the variable n.  
 Evaluation of Method B)  
In this method, the deviation on file system provides non-resemblance of 
obfuscated data and difficulty on reverse engineering. Data obfuscator 
changes the number of disk sectors in a cluster and the format of the file 
allocation table in the file system so that the infrastructure service provider 
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cannot understand the file system structure.  In order to prevent the service 
providers from extracting the users’ specific confidential data from network 
traffics, the user’s specific confidential data is encrypted in the user’s 
computer before being sent to service provider’s infrastructure.  
 Evaluation of Method C)  
In this method, the transformation of the format or value of users’ input data 
provides non-resemblance of obfuscated data and difficulty on reverse 
engineering. All the operations associated with the original data must also be 
applicable to the transformed data so that the software service instance is able 
to process the obfuscated data. Given input data x, a set of associated 
operations{P1,…, Pn}, an obfuscation function O, a secret key k, and de-
obfuscation function D, Pi(x) = D(Pi(O(x,k)),k), where 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then 
Obfuscation function O and de-obfuscation function D have following 
properties: 
i) D(F(O(x, k), k) = F(x), where k is an obfuscation key unknown to the 
infrastructure service provider 
ii) The infrastructure service provider cannot understand the meaning of x 
by examining O(x, k) 
iii) D or k cannot be derived from O 
Hence this method provides perfect non-resemblance of obfuscated data and 
makes the reverse engineering of the obfuscated data computationally impossible.  
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CHAPTER 5 
ANONYMOUS SERVICE USAGE AND PAYMENT IN SERVICE-BASED 
SYSTEMS 
This chapter presents an approach to protecting, from service providers, 
the anonymity of users’ service usages and payment for their service usages in 
service-based systems. This approach has the following three features: 1) a user 
can access and use a service anonymously using his/her pseudonyms, 2) the user 
can pay the service provider for the his/her service usages without revealing 
his/her real identity, and 3) if the user performs improper activities, the user’s 
pseudonyms are revoked and the user’s real identity will be revealed by a trusted 
authority. 
The anonymity discussed in this paper can be applicable at the transaction 
level between users and service providers. The “anonymous service usage” is 
defined as a user initiates a secure communication session with a service provider 
using a pseudonym, sends inputs to the service being used and receives outputs 
from the service. In addition, “anonymous payment” implies that a user makes 
payment for his/her service usages to the provider of the service without revealing 
his/her real identity. 
Huang [62] presented a user identity anonymization approach in 
distributed computing systems, in which a user’s real identity and pseudonyms are 
managed by separate trusted authorities. A user obtains a certification ticket from 
a trusted authority using his/her real identity, and then the user obtains his/her 
pseudonym certificates from another trusted authority using the certification ticket. 
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This architecture has a major advantage that a user’s anonymity will not be 
compromised even if one of the trusted authorities is compromised by attackers.        
In most cases of communications using Internet, the IP address of an 
entity is equivalent to its identity. Hence, it is important to hide the IP address in 
order to maintain the anonymity of its entity. A common way to hide the IP 
address is to use a proxy, which is a single server that accepts the identity of the 
connection from an initiator of an anonymous connection and forwards it to the 
responder, who is the service provider that the initiator wishes to contact 
anonymously [63, 64]. With this single-proxy method, the responders cannot see 
the actual IP addresses of the initiators. For example, the Anonymizer [63] and 
Lucent Personalized Web Assistant (LPWA) [64] use a proxy server to repackage 
users’ web surfing requests to disguise their original IP addresses. 
User-adaptive (or “personalized”) applications aim at anticipating the 
needs of each individual user, and adapting to these needs while interacting with 
the user [65]. One problem of the user-adaptive applications is that user 
anonymization can be easily compromised in personalized systems because a 
user’s activities are profiled and possibly linked to the real identity of the user. An 
approach for protecting user anonymity in the user-adaptive systems is presented 
in [66], in which users’ anonymity is protected by pseudonyms and mix networks 
[67].  
A distributed overlay network, called Tor [68], was developed to 
anonymize TCP-based communications over a computer network using onion 
routers [69]. Tor provides perfect forward security so that users can connect to 
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Internet sites without revealing their logical or physical locations to any sites on 
the Internet or to eavesdroppers. Tor can be easily used by many applications, like 
Web browsing, secure shell, and instant messaging. These approaches, however, 
are not suitable for SBS because they do not support anonymous payment of 
service usages.  
A protocol for anonymous payment using anonymous digital cash was 
introduced in [70]. The anonymous digital cash is different from credit cards 
because the owner of the anonymous digital cash is non-traceable. This protocol 
works well for protecting the anonymity of the users’ identities in any types of 
online transactions, but this protocol cannot be adopted in real world applications 
because this protocol can be easily abused by many criminals [71]. For example, a 
terrorist may threaten and force a bank to blindly sign digital cash without any 
personal contact with the bank. Then, the bank or police will have no way to trace 
the digital cash. 
 
5.1 Anonymous Service Usage Protocol 
An Anonymous Service Usage Protocol (ASUP) using public key 
infrastructure (PKI) certificates is developed, in which a user can use a service 
anonymously and pay for his/her service usages without revealing his/her real 
identity.  In this paper, a protocol is defined as a formal description of digital 
message formats and the rules for exchanging those digital messages among 
communicating entities. ASUP involves the following four entities: 
 A user who wishes to use a service anonymously.      
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 The Trusted Authority (TA) who is responsible for authenticating the users 
based on their real identities. After the users successfully pass the authentication 
of the TA, the TA issues a pseudonym certificate to each of the authenticated 
users for their anonymous service access. 
 A Payment Authority (PA), who is a trusted entity and issues a payment 
certificate to a user, who requests to make a payment for his/her service usages. 
The payment certificate can be used as a proof to a service provider that the PA 
will pay for the user’s service usages without revealing the user’s real identity. 
The PA must have the information of the user’s financial or billing information 
before issuing a payment certificate to the user. For example, a bank can issue a 
payment certificate for its customers who have sufficient deposit in its 
customers’ accounts. 
 A service provider (SP), who provides online services. A service provider may 
be malicious and interested in collecting and profiling users’ online transactions. 
 
In ASUP, it is assumed that each of the above four entities already has 
his/her own public and private key pair. ASUP uses the following three types of 
PKI certificates for anonymous service usage and payment: 
 A real identity certificate (RICert), which is an electronic document containing 
a user’s real identity information, such as name, address, or social security 
number, and the user’s public key. The RICert is digitally signed by the TA’s 
private key so that it is not forgeable or alterable.  
 A pseudonym certificate (PCert) which is an electronic document containing a 
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user’s pseudonym, the public key of the pseudonym and the user’s RICert. The 
user’s RICert is encrypted with the TA’s private key so that no unauthorized 
entities can know the user’s real identity from the PCert. The real identity of the 
user can be revealed by the TA only if a service provider detects the user 
conducting an illegal activity using the PCert. The PCert is digitally signed by 
the TA so that it is not forgeable or alterable.   
 A payment certificate (PaCert), which is an electronic document issued to a 
user by a PA, which proves that the PA will pay for the user’s service usage. A 
PaCert contains the PA name and PCert of the user. It is also digitally signed 
with the PA’s private key so that it is not forgeable or alterable.  
 
Overall approach to anonymous service usage and payment is depicted in Figure 6, 
and can be summarized as follows: 
Figure 6: Anonymous Service Usage and Payment Using ASUP 
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An Approach for Anonymous Service Usage in SBS 
S1) A user, who has a RICert issued by the TA, creates a pseudonym and requests 
the TA for a PCert of the pseudonym.  
S2) The TA verifies the RICert of the user and issues a PCert to the user. 
S3) The user requests a PA for a PaCert.   
S4) The PA verifies RICert of the user and issues a PaCert for the user’s 
pseudonym. 
S5) The user uses a service anonymously using PCert and PaCert.  
S6) The service provider sends a bill to the PA for the service usages by the user. 
S7) The PA pays the bill. 
 
The following types of possible attacks on ASUP are identified, which 
may attempt on the participants of the ASUP  
A1) Impersonation. A malicious service provider or a third party attacker may 
steal a user’s PCert or PaCert and attempt to impersonate the user.  
A2) Unauthorized bill. A malicious service provider obtains a user’s PaCert, and 
generates and sends a fake bill to the PA. 
A3) Multiple charges. A service provider may charges the same service usages 
multiple times. 
A4) User profiling. A service provider, whose services are used by a user, may 
profile the user based on the user’s online transactions and attempt to link the 
user’s pseudonyms to the user’s real identity.  
A5) Malicious activities of a user. A malicious user may use a fake PCert or 
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PaCert to perform illegal activities. 
A6) Replay attack. A third party attacker may launch replay attacks [72] to steal a 
user’s PCert or PaCert certificates or waste system resources of the entities 
involved in ASUP. 
A7) Refuse of payment. A malicious user may refuse to pay the bill for his/her 
actual service usages because the service provider does not know the real 
identity of the user. 
How ASUP can prevent all these types of attacks will be discussed in Section 5.3.  
 
ASUP consists of the following four sub-protocols: 
 Sub-protocol 1: The protocol for issuing PCert, which is described in Steps S1) 
and S2).  
 Sub-protocol 2: The protocol for issuing PaCert, which is described in Steps S3) 
and S4).  
 Sub-protocol 3: The protocol for anonymous service usage and billing, which is 
described in Step S5).  
 Sub-protocol 4: The protocol for anonymous payment, which is described in 
Steps S6) and S7). 
 
The following notations will be used in ASUP: 
 ((Pt, St), (Pb, Sb), (Psp, Ssp) and (Pa, Sa)) are the public/private key pairs of TA, 
PA, service provider and user, respectively. 
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 Timet, Timeb, Timesp and Timea are the time stamps generated by TA, PA, 
service provider and user, respectively. 
 H is the hash function used in ASUP.  
 Ek(M) is an encrypted message M using the encryption key K 
 
It is assumed that all the message exchanges in ASUP occur through 
insecure communication networks, such as Internet, and all the messages can be 
eavesdropped by malicious third parties. The description of each of these four 
sub-protocols is as follows: 
Description of Sub-protocol 1:   
1-1) The user has a RICert = [IDa, ESt(H(IDa) ], where IDa = [Name, Address, 
SSN, Pa]     
1-2) The user sends a request RQ1 = [EPt(reqp, RICert, Timea)] to the TA, 
where reqp indicates that this message is for  requesting a PCert.   
1-3) Upon receiving RQ1, the TA decrypts RQ1 and verifies the RICert using Pt. 
The TA checks its database to ensure that the RICert is neither expired, nor 
revoked.    
1-4) Upon successful verification of RICert, the TA generates a random 
variable r1, and sends CH1 = [EPa(reqp, r1, Timet)] to the user. 
1-5) Upon receiving CH1, the user decrypts CH1, creates a pseudonym PS and 
sends RP1 = [EPt(reqp, r1, PS, Timea)] to the TA.  
1-6) Upon  receiving RP1, the TA decrypts RP1, verifies r1, and issues a PCert 
for the user. The contents of the PCert are as follows: 
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PCert = [TA, PS, Timet, H(RICert || r1), EPt(RICert || r1), SigTA], where || is a 
concatenation operator, and  
SigTA = ESt(H(TA || PS || Timet || H(RICert || r1) || EPt(RICert || r1)) 
1-7) The TA sends EPa(PCert) to the user.  
1-8) The user decrypts EPa(PCert) and obtains the PCert.  
1-9) The TA maintains the list of PCerts issued for each user in its database. 
When an illegal activity of a user is reported, TA revokes the RICert and all 
the PCerts associated with the user.  
 
Description of Sub-protocol 2:   
2-1) The user sends a request RQ2 = [EPb(reqb, RICert, r1, PCert, Timea)] to a 
PA, where reqb is a pre-defined value indicating that this message is for the 
PaCert issuing process.       
2-2) Upon receiving RQ2, the PA verifies RICert using Pt , calculate H(RICert || 
r1) and verifies whether the PCert is issued for the RICert.  
2-3) Upon successful verification of RICert and PCert, the PA generates a 
random variable r2, and sends CH2 = [EPa(reqb, r2, Timeb)] to the user. 
2-4) Upon receiving CH2, the user decrypts CH2, generates a public/private key 
pair (Ppseu, Spseu) and sends RP2 = [EPb(reqb, r2, Ppseu, Timea)] to the PA 
2-5) Upon receiving RP2, the PA decrypts it, verifies the r2, generates an 
agreement AG = [PA name, PCert, the user’s account#, Ppseu], and sends EPa 
(AG) to the user.  
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2-6) Upon receiving AG, the user verifies the AG, and sends   EPb (SignedAG) 
to the PA, where SignedAG = [ESa(H(AG))] 
2-7) Upon receiving SignedAG, the PA verifies the SignedAG using Pa, and 
stores the agreement (AG || SignedAG) in the PA’s database. 
2-8) The PA issues a PaCert for the user with the following  contents : 
PaCert = [PA name, PCert, Ppseu, Timeb, expiration date, Sigb], where 
Sigb = ESb(H(PA name || PCert || Ppseu || Timeb || expiration date ))     
2-9) The PA sends EPa(PaCert) to the user.  
2-10) The user decrypts EPa(PaCert) and obtains the PaCert.               
Description of Sub-protocol 3:   
3-1) The user sends PCert and PaCert to a service provider 
3-2) The service provider verifies the authenticity of the certifications using Pt 
and Pb.  
3-3) The service provider verifies with the TA whether the the PCert has been 
revoked.  
3-4) If the PCert is valid, the service provider generates a session key K and 
sends Ini1 = EPpseu(K, expiration time of K, ESsp(H(K)) to the user. 
3-5) Receiving on Ini1, the user decrypts it, verifies H(K) using Psp, and starts a 
secure communication session with the service provider using K. Note that K 
is a symmetric key shared between the user and service provider . 
3-6) The user sends SR =[service_request, Timea, ESpseu(H(service_request || 
Timea)], where service_ request =[PCert, service name, user inputs] 
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3-7) The service provider stores SR in its database. The service provider also 
maintains audit trails for processing the service request of the user. 
3-8) After completing the process of the service request, the service provider 
send ESsp(Bill) to the user, where Bill = [service_request, $amount, Timesp].  
3-9) Upon receiving ESsp(Bill), the user decrypts it using Psp, verifies the 
amount, generates a random unique string U, and sends SignedBill = [Bill, 
YCert, U, ESpseu(H(Bill || YCert || U))]. Note that U should be long enough to 
reduce the chance of another person also using it to a negligible level.                      
 
Description of Sub-protocol 4: 
4-1) The service provider sends B = ESsp(SignedBill, Timesp ) to the PA. 
4-2) Upon receiving B, the PA decrypts it using Psp, verifies the signature of 
SignedBill using Ppseu.  
4-3) The PA checks its database to ensure that a SignedBill with the same 
unique string U has not been previously paid.   
4-4) If the SignedBill has not been paid before, the PA accepts the bill and 
makes a payment to the service provider.  
4-5) The PA stores SignedBill in its database.  
 
The message exchanges among entities in each step of the ASUP are summarized 
in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Message Exchanges in ASUP 
 
S1) 
 
 
 
 
 
S2) 
 
 
S3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S5) 
 
S6) 
 
user →TA: RQ1 = [EPt(reqp, RICert, Timea)] 
 
TA→user: CH1 = [EPa(reqp, r1, Timet)]    
 
user →TA: RP1 = [EPt(reqp, r1, PS, Timea)]  
 
TA→user: PCert  
   = [TA, PS, Timet, H(RICert || r1), EPt(RICert || r1), SigTA] 
 
user →PA: RQ2 = [EPb(reqb, RICert, r1, PCert, Timea)] 
 
PA→user: CH2 = [EPa(reqb, r2, Timeb)] 
 
user→PA: RP2 = [EPb(reqb, r2, Ppseu, Timea)] 
 
PA→user: AG 
      =[PA name, PCert,  the user’s account#, Ppseu]) 
 
user→PA: SignedAG 
 
PA→user: PaCert 
     = [PA name, PCert, Ppseu, Timeb, expiration date, Sigb] 
 
user→SP: PCert ||PaCert 
 
SP→user: Ini1 = EPpseu(K, expiration time of K, ESsp(H(K)) user→SP:  
SR =[service_request, Timea, ESpseu(H(service_request || Timea)] 
 
SP→user: Bill = [service_request, $amount, Timesp] 
user→SP: SignedBill  
         = [Bill, PaCert, U, ESpseu(H(Bill || PaCert || U))] 
 
SP→PA: B = ESsp(SignedBill, Timesp ) 
 
PA →SP: make a payment    
 
 
5.2 Anonymity Assessment 
The criteria for evaluating anonymity of a user in a system are presented 
in [73-74]. I will discuss each of these criteria and show that ASUP satisfies each 
of these criteria. 
 Sender-anonymity means that the identity of the party who sends a message is 
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hidden. In my approach, a user initiates a service request to a service provider. 
Hence, the user is considered as the sender. The sender’s anonymity of the 
sender can be achieved by the sender using pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are 
generated by the user so that service providers cannot infer the real identity of 
the user from the pseudonyms. For the billing and payment processes, the user 
uses a PaCert to make an anonymous payment without revealing his/her real 
identity so that the sender anonymity can still be protected. 
 Receiver-anonymity means that the identity of the party who receives a message 
is hidden. ASUP is mainly designed for anonymous use of SBS. Since the 
service providers of a SBS are usually publically known, the receiver anonymity 
in my approach is not considered.  
 Unlinkability means that a user may make multiple transactions with a service 
without the service provider being able to link these transactions together. The 
unlinkability ensures that the users’ online transactions cannot be profiled by 
service providers. In ASUP, a user can obtain PCerts as much as he/she wants, 
as long as he/she does not violate the sub-protocol 1 with TA. This means that 
the user may use a new pseudonym for each transaction with a service. In this 
way, the unlinkability can be achieved based on the following assumption: SBS 
usually involves a large number of anonymous users, and the service providers 
will not be able to link different pseudonyms to the same user by observing the 
transactions. 
 Unobservability means that certain items of interest (IOI), such as message, 
event, and transaction, are not distinguishable from any other IOI. This means 
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that third-party adversaries are not able to discern user’s messages from a 
random noise. ASUP provides unobservability for all the messages exchanged 
among entities because the messages are encrypted before being sent out 
through the Internet.  
 Managability means that if a user performs an illegal activity using a 
pseudonym, all the pseudonyms associated with the user are revoked and the 
real identity of the user can be traced. The revocation of all the pseudonyms of 
the user should prevent the user from accessing any service. For example, if a 
user has ten pseudonyms and performs an illegal activity with one of the 
pseudonyms, then all ten pseudonyms of the user must be revoked to prevent the 
user from further communicating with other service providers. In addition, 
revoking the real identity of the user is necessary to prevent the user from 
obtaining new pseudonyms. In ASUP, the TA maintains the list of PCerts issued 
for each user in its database. When an illegal activity of a user is reported, TA 
revokes the RICert and all the PCerts associated with the user. How a service 
provider reports an illegal activity of user will be discussed in Subsection 5.3. 
Every service provider verifies with the TA whether a user’s pseudonym has 
been revoked before establishing a communication session with the user so that 
revoked users cannot access any service. 
 Admissibility means that a digital document can be submitted to the legal 
authority, such as the court as an evidence of transaction or an incident. The 
admissibility of ASUP is provided by the digital signature scheme using PKI. 
Since any of digitally signed documents is not alterable nor forgeable, the 
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following digital documents used in ASUP are admissible: 1) a PCert signed by 
the TA, which proves the real identity of the owner of the PCert, 2) a PaCert 
signed by a PA, which proves the real identity of the owner of the PaCert, 3) a 
service_request signed by a user, which proves that the user sent the 
service_request to the service provider, and 4) a bill signed by a user, which 
proves that the user approved to pay for the bill. 
 
5.3 Security Assessment 
This section will discuss how ASUP prevents the possible attacks 
identified in Section 5.1.     
 Impersonation: ASUP provides unobservability for all the messages exchanged 
among entities. Hence, a user’s PCert or PaCert cannot be stolen by third-party 
adversaries through eavesdropping the communications among entities in ASUP. 
A user’s PCert or PaCert can be obtained by a malicious service provider, who 
may later attempt to impersonate the user. In order to prevent a malicious 
service provider from impersonating a user, ASUP uses the challenge-response 
mechanisms in Steps 1-4) and 1-5) of Sub-protocol 1, Steps 2-4) and 2-5) of 
Sub-protocol 2, and Steps 3-4) and 3-5) of Sub-protocol 3. Hence no service 
provider can impersonate a user without knowing the user’s private keys, which 
are only known to the user. 
 Unauthorized bill: In order to prevent a malicious service provider from faking 
a bill using a user’s PaCert, ASUP requires service providers to get the user’s 
digital signature before sending a bill to a PA in Step 3-9) of Sub-protocol 3. If a 
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service provider sends a bogus bill to a PA, the PA will notice it by verifying the 
user’s digital signature. 
 Multiple charges: In order to prevent a malicious service provider from sending 
the same bill to a PA more than once, ASUP requires a user to generate a 
random unique string and attach it to a bill before signing the bill in Step 3-9) of 
Sub-protocol 3. Every time a PA pays for a bill, the PA verifies the unique 
number attached to the bill by checking whether the bill with the same unique 
string has been paid before. After successful verification and payment of the bill, 
the PA stores the unique number attached to the bill in its database. Service 
providers cannot modify the unique string on the bill because it is digitally 
signed by the user.  
 Malicious activities of user: As discussed in Subsection 5.1, ASUP provides the 
manageability for revoking the PCerts and RICert of a user who performed 
illegal activities. Service providers maintain audit trails for users’ activities in 
their services in Step 3-7) of Sub-protocol 3. When improper activities of a user 
are detected, the TA reveals the real identity of the user from the user’s PCert, 
and revokes all the Pcerts associated with the user from its database. Step 1-3) in 
Sub-protocol 1 and Step 3-3) in Sub-protocol 3 ensure that a revoked user 
cannot receive a new PCert from the TA or access a service using previously 
issued PCerts.        
 User Profiling: As discussed in Section 5.1, ASUP provides unlinkability 
through allowing a user has multiple PCerts.    
 Replay Attack: In ASUP, all the messages contain time stamps, denoted by 
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Timet, Timeb, Timesp and Timea. The timestamps prevent the adversaries from 
launching replay attacks. Any message replayed by an attacker can be detected 
through the verification of the timestamps [72]. 
 Refuse of payment: ASUP requires users to sign service-requests before they 
send their service-requests. As discussed in Section 5.1, a service_request 
signed by a user proves that the user sent the service_request to the service 
provider, and it is non-repudiative and admissible.  
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CHAPTER 6 
SOFTWARE MODULE DECOMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTED 
EXECUTIONS IN SBS 
This chapter presents an approach to software module decomposition and 
distributed executions in service-based systems to protect users’ data 
confidentiality.  
 
6.1 Overview of SBS Application Development 
 
The basic underlying idea of the approach to protecting users’ confidential 
data is that a SBS is divided into software providers and infrastructure service 
providers as shown in Figure 7. Then an application is decomposed into smaller 
software modules, and those software modules are distributed to different 
infrastructure service providers for executions. By decomposing application into 
software modules and distributing their executions, no infrastructure service 
provider knows overall functionality of the software nor has the entire set of users’ 
data.  
In the approach to software decomposition and distributed execution, users 
first provide data specifications to application developers. The data specification 
specifies users’ data sets and their requirements on data confidentiality. The 
confidentiality requirements define rules for ) how the data should be stored in 
SBS 2) how the data should be flowed in SBS and 3) how the data should be 
processed in SBS. The data specifications can be specified using a data 
specification language, which will be discussed in Section 6.2. SBS application 
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providers develop SBS applications based on the data specifications provided by 
users. A SBS application consists of multiple software modules, which will be 
distributed and executed in distinct infrastructures of data processing service 
providers. The SBS application satisfies the users’ data confidentiality 
requirements using data obfuscation, anonymization of users’ identities, 
partitioning users’ data set and controlling the data flows in SBS.  The software 
module decomposition process consists of two phases: requirement phase and 
development phase.  
 
 
Figure 7:  An Approach to Software Decomposition and Distributed Execution  
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6.2 Requirement Phase 
In the requirement phase, a user specifies his/her data sets and requirements 
on data confidentiality using a data specification model. A data specification 
model is developed, which has the following seven entities as shown in Figure 8:  
 Data Set consists of Data Description, Data Classification, Personally 
Identifiable Information, Confidentiality Requirements, Encryption Key and 
Obfuscation Key. User’s entire data is partitioned into multiple data sets. 
 
 
 
 Data Description describes data type and data structure in the data set. The 
data can be structured data or unstructured data. Structured data includes data 
Figure 8: The Format of Data Specification of Users’ Confidentiality 
Requirements 
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tables, data columns and data rows in relational database, and data trees in 
XML database.  Unstructured data includes document files, images and videos. 
 Data Classification specifies sensitivity of the data. The data in the data set 
can be classified in three levels as shown in Table 4.  
 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) specifies PII in the data set, such as 
names, addresses and social security numbers. 
 Confidentiality Requirements specifies 1) how the data should be stored in 
SBS, 2) how the data should be processed in SBS and 3) how the data should 
be flowed in SBS. For the data storage, user specifies the data set to be stored 
in the infrastructure in a plain form, an obfuscated form or an encrypted form. 
For the data processing, user specifies the data set to be processed in the 
infrastructure of service providers in a plain form or an obfuscated form. If the 
user wants the data set to be processed using data obfuscation, he/her also 
specifies which obfuscation method to be used. For the data flow in SBS, user 
specifies data sets that should not be processed by same data processing 
service providers.  It is defined that data sets D1 and D2 is incompatible if D1 
and D2 should not be processed by the same infrastructure provider.    
 Encryption Key to be used to encrypt the data set. 
 Obfuscation Key to be used to obfuscate the data set. 
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Table 4: Data Classification to Specify Sensitivities of Users’ Data 
 Public Private Confidential 
Description 
Not 
sensitive; 
available to 
anyone 
Slightly sensitive; 
include personal 
information 
Extremely sensitive; 
should not disclosed to 
any of unauthorized 
entities 
Impact of 
unauthorized 
disclosure 
N/A 
Violation of privacy 
of individual person 
Data confidentiality is 
compromised 
How to store 
Stored in a 
plain format 
Stored in an 
encrypted or 
obfuscated format 
Stored in an encrypted 
format 
How to 
process 
Processed in 
a plain 
format 
Processed using data 
obfuscation or user 
identity 
anonymization. 
If data obfuscation 
and user identity 
anoymization is not 
applicable, must be 
processed in a trusted 
domain. 
Processed using data 
obfuscation. 
If data obfuscation is not 
applicable, must be 
processed in a trusted 
domain. 
 
          A specification language for users to specify their data confidentiality 
requirements is developed. The syntax of the specification language is described 
in Backus-Naur Form (BNF) as follows: 
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In the requirement phase, Function-Oriented Design Model [75] is used to 
identify the functional units of the application, and Data-Flow Diagram (DFD) 
[76] is used to identify data sets associated with the inputs of each of the 
functional units.  Then a user specifies his/her data confidentiality requirements 
on each data set using the specification language. The user can generate his/her 
data confidentiality requirements as follows: 
Confidentiality Requirements Specification Process 
Step 1) Application developer identifies the functional units of the application 
using the Function-Oriented Design Model 
Step 2) The application developers construct Data-Flow Diagram (DFD) to show 
data flows among functional units.  
<User’s Data> ::= <Data Set>+ 
<Data Set>:: = “(“ {<Set ID#>, <Data Description>, <Data Classification>, 
<Personally Identifiable Information>, <Confidentiality Requirements>, 
<Encryption Key>, <Obfuscation Key>} “)” 
<Data Description> ::= “(“ {<Unstructured Data>* , <Structured Data>*} “)” 
<Unstructured Data> ::= <Documents>
*
 <Images>* <Videos>* <Others>* 
<Structured Data> ::= <Data tables>
*
 <Data columns>* <Data rows>* <XML 
trees>* 
<Data Classification> ::= “Public” | “Private” | “Confidential” 
<Confidentiality Requirements> ::= “(“ { <Storage Requirements>, <Process 
Requirements> , <Data Flow Requirements> } “)” 
<Storage Requirements> ::= “Plain” | “Encrypted” |  “Obfuscated” 
<Process Requirements> ::= “Plain” | <Obfuscation Method> 
<Obfuscation Method> ::= “Method1” | “Method2” | “Method3” 
<Data Flow Requirements> ::= “( {<Set ID#>*} “)" 
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Step3) The user identifies his/her data sets associated with the inputs of each 
functional unit. 
Step 4) The user specifies his/her confidentiality requirements by the following 
procedure: 
 
To show this process, consider a credit card company wants to develop an 
application to automatically generate bills for its customers. The company has two 
data sets, which are two columns: Name and Purchase History. The column Name 
contains names of the company’s customers, and the column History contains the 
purchasing histories of each customer. The company wants to make sure that 
1 S = {s | s is data sets identified in Step3} 
2 For each data set s1 ∈ S: 
3 Specify <Data Description> of s1 by choosing <Documents>
, 
<Images>, <Videos>, <Data tables>, <Data columns>, <Data rows> or 
<XML trees> 
4  Specify <Data Classification> of s1 from Table 4. 
5  If s1 must be stored in a encrypted form,  
Set <Storage Requirements> of s1 = “Encrypted” 
6  If s1 must be stored in a obfuscated form, 
  Set <Storage Requirement> of s1 = “Obfuscated” 
7  If s1 must be processed in a obfuscated form, 
  Specify which obfuscation method to be used for s1 
8  For each data set s2 ∈ S: 
  If s1 and s2 are incompatible, 
   Add <Data Flow Requirements> of s1 = <Set ID#> of s2 
9  Generate an encryption key for s1 
10 Generate an obfuscation key for s1 
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Infrastructure providers of SBS cannot link a customer with any purchasing 
history. The user, who is the company, specifies its data confidentiality 
requirements by following the approach presented in Section 6.2. 
Step 1) Three functional units of the application are identified as follows:  
Function F1: Sort the column Name by customers’ last name  
Function F2: Find all purchasing history for each customers  
Function F3: Find total amount of purchases for each customers  
Step 2) Customers’ name and purchasing histories are both classified as 
confidential.  
Step3) Associate the columns Name and Purchase History to Functions F1 and F2 
respectively.  
Step 4) Using the results in the above steps and the specification procedure 
discussed in Section 6.2, the confidentiality requirements are: 
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6.3 Application Development Phase 
 
In the development phase, application developer develops a SBS 
application based on user’s data specification and confidentiality requirements. A 
SBS application consists of multiple software modules, which will be distributed 
and executed in distinct infrastructures of the SBS service providers.  
<User’s Data> ::= <S1> <S2> 
<S1>:: = “(“ {<1>, <Data Description1>, <Data Classification1>,  
<Confidentiality Requirements1>, <Encryption Key1>, <Obfuscation Key1>} 
“)” 
<S2>:: = “(“ {<2>, <Data Description2>, <Data Classification2>,  
<Confidentiality Requirements2>, <Encryption Key2>, <Obfuscation Key2>} 
“)” 
<Data Description1> ::= column Name 
<Data Description2> ::= column History 
<Data Classification1> ::= “Confidential”  
<Data Classification2> ::= “Confidential” 
<Confidentiality Requirements1> ::= “(“ { <Storage Requirements1>, 
<Process Requirements1> , <Data Flow Requirements1> } “)” 
<Confidentiality Requirements2> ::= “(“ { <Storage Requirements2>, 
<Process Requirements2> , <Data Flow Requirements2> } “)” 
<Storage Requirements1> ::= “Encrypted”  
<Process Requirements1> ::= “Method3” 
<Storage Requirements2> ::= “Encrypted”  
<Process Requirements2> ::= “Method3” 
<Data Flow Requirement1> ::= 2 
<Data Flow Requirement2> ::= 1 
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How to achieve high cohesion of individual software modules and low 
coupling among software modules are major challenges of developing distributed 
and parallel applications. High cohesion of a software module means that there 
should be many interactions among the functions of the module, and the module 
developers must provide well-defined interfaces for using the functions of the 
module by other modules. High coupling among modules means that the 
execution of one module depends on the implementation of other modules, and it 
causes not only a burden for code evolution of the module, but also for reusing 
modules in a different application context. It also makes distributed deployment 
and maintenance very complex and unmanageable for large SBSs because 
debugging and testing of an application with high coupling among modules is 
very time-intensive and expensive. In order to achieve low coupling among 
modules, standard sets of interfaces and protocols among distributed modules in 
the SBSs are needed so that module developers are able to implement the 
functionalities of modules independently without concerning with the 
implementation of other modules. In addition, standard platforms for the 
deploying and executing modules are needed. These platforms automatically 
manage the deployment and execution of the modules so that module developers 
do not need to worry about the complexity of module deployment and execution 
environments during the module development phase.  In the remainder of this 
section, an approach to achieve high cohesion of individual modules and low 
coupling among modules will be presented. 
In [77], I have presented a software engineering framework for combining 
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these services computing and cloud computing paradigms in a software 
engineering framework to achieve high cohesion of individual modules and low 
coupling among modules. The reasons that I combined these two computing 
paradigms are as follows. Services computing and cloud computing are two 
separate paradigms, and each has certain advantages for application development. 
Application developers can use services computing alone, cloud computing alone, 
or a combination of the two. However, using only one of the computing 
paradigms alone cannot achieve both high cohesion of individual module and low 
couplings among the modules. For example, a major challenge of developing 
SBSs using SOA is lack of methods for deployment of software modules on 
distributed servers. As a consequence, there may be high couplings between 
modules and platforms for executing the modules. Cloud computing can help 
meet that challenge through the use of standardized platforms and virtualization 
of computing resources. On the other hand, there are few standard sets of 
interfaces and protocols among distributed software modules for cloud computing 
systems. Consequently, high cohesion of individual modules and low coupling 
among modules cannot be achieved by cloud computing alone. Services 
computing can help meet that challenge through service oriented architecture 
(SOA) standard interfaces for software modules and communication protocols 
among the software modules. The standard sets of interfaces among distributed 
modules help module developers implement the functionalities of modules 
independently without concerning with implementations of other modules. The 
standard sets of protocols among distributed modules help module developers 
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provide well-defined and highly cohesive functionalities of the module. Figure 9 
shows tour software engineering framework for module development. 
 
 
 
The module developers follow standard interfaces of SOA when they 
develop software modules. The functionalities of software modules are delivered 
through the standard protocols of SOA. Standard platforms for the deploying and 
executing modules are provided by cloud computing virtualization technology.  
In my framework, application developers do not need to concern with the 
complexity of module deployment and execution environments in the application 
development phase because any computing environments and resources required 
for executing the software modules, such as operating systems, platforms, 
communication channels and system resources, can be dynamically virtualized in 
the SBS infrastructures of infrastructure service providers. Each software module 
can be developed by the software module developers using the software 
Figure 9: Software Engineering Framework for Combining Services Computing 
and Cloud Computing to Achieve High Cohesion and Low Coupling among 
Software Modules 
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development methods available for centralized and monolithic applications, such 
as object-oriented programming and aspect-oriented programming. Most 
importantly, each module can be tested in isolation and on a single machine, using 
agile and iterative development techniques, which are generally much harder to 
use for distributed applications. 
 In my framework, the decomposition of an SBS application into software 
modules to satisfy users’ data confidentiality requirements can be done as follows: 
Software Decomposition Process 
Step 1) Identify the functional units of the application based on application 
requirements using Function-Oriented Design Model [75] 
Step 2) Construct Data-Flow Diagram (DFD) [76] to show data flows among 
functional units.  
Step3) Identify users’ data sets associated with each functional unit 
Step 4) Transform the Data-Flow Diagram to undirected weighted tree. Each node 
represents a functional unit. Each edge represents data flows between nodes. The 
weight of each edge represents the number of data flows between nodes in the 
Data-Flow Diagram. 
Step 5) Find the optimal software decomposition using the following Greedy 
Algorithm:
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 To illustrate this process, consider the same example of the credit card 
company who wants to develop an application to automatically generate bills for 
its customers in Section 6.2. The company has two data sets, which are two 
columns: Name and Purchase History. The two columns are specified as 
confidential data by the company. 
Step 1) The same step with the Step1) of the Confidentiality Requirements 
Specification Process in Section 6.2, and the functional units are:  
Function F1: Sort the column Name by customers’ last name  
Function F2: Find all purchasing history for each customers  
Function F3: Find total amount of purchases for each customers  
Step 2) The generated data-flow diagram (DFD) is given below  
T = Weighed tree 
N = {n | n is a node in T} 
E = {e | e is a edge in T} 
E’ = {e | e connects nodes n1 and n2 ∈ N, and n1 and n2 are compatible} 
M = {m | m is a software module} 
While (E’ ≠ Ø ) 
 Find e ∈ E’ which has the biggest weight 
 Integrate n1 and n2 into software module M 
 Remove n1 and n2 from N 
 Remove e from E 
 Remove e from E’ 
 E’ = {e | e connects nodes n1 and n2 ∈ N, and n1 and n2 are  
         compatible}  
 
  71 
             
Step3) The same step with the Step3) of the Confidentiality Requirements 
Specification Process in Section 6.2, and the columns Name and Purchase History 
are associated to Functions F1 and F2 respectively.  
Step 4) Transform the Data-Flow Diagram to the following undirected weighted 
tree: 
              
Step 5) Using the results in the above steps and the Greedy algorithm, the module 
decomposition are:  
             
 
 
Software Module = {M1, M2} 
F1 ∈ M1, F2 ∈ M2, F3 ∈ M2 
 
T = Weighed tree 
N = {F1, F2, F3} 
E = { F1 → F2, F2 → F3} 
E’ = {F2, F3} 
 
F = {F1, F2, F3} 
Data Flows = {F1 → F2, F2 → F3} 
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CHAPTER 7 
ADAPTIVE RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR SBS  
In this Chapter, an approach to adaptive resource allocation for SBSs will 
be presented.  
 
7.1 Background for Adaptive Resource Allocation in SBS    
The rapid growth of the Internet has enabled many applications involving 
many users and service providers distributed in various geographical locations.  In 
order to facilitate the development of such applications, service-oriented 
architecture (SOA) has been adopted in various distributed systems, such as web 
service, grid computing systems, utility computing systems and SBS computing 
systems. Such systems are referred as service-based systems (SBS), and leads to 
the vision of “Internet as a supercomputer.”  This vision incorporates the concepts 
of “software as a service”, “platform as a service”, “infrastructure as a service” 
and “resources as a service,” and requires software systems running on the open 
and dynamic Internet with the capabilities of context-awareness, self-management 
and autonomous adaptation for changes in runtime environment. Such systems 
residing on the Internet are referred in general as Internetware systems. 
A major challenge for the Internetware systems to satisfy various 
application requirements is to manage the quality of service (QoS) in runtime due 
to the dynamic, loosely coupled, and compositional nature of SOA. Many studies 
have identified important QoS features of SOA systems [78, 79], such as 
throughput, timeliness and security, which are directly affected by the limitation 
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of system resources. It is noted that the system resource considered here is for 
large-scale aggregation of distributed computing resources working together over 
the Internet as a tremendous virtual computer [80-82]. For example, computing 
grids and SBSs are vast resource pools for on-demand requests over the Internet. 
In order to manage the QoS for such systems, an effective resource allocation 
technique for dynamically scalable distributed system resources is needed.  In 
order to achieve this goal, the SBS needs the capabilities of monitoring the 
changing system status, analyzing and controlling system QoS features, and 
adapting its service configuration to satisfy the QoS requirements of multiple 
workflows simultaneously. Since multiple services are often hosted by the same 
server in SBS, and the services in the same server compete for the limited 
available resources of the server, such as CPU-time, memory and network 
bandwidth, different resource allocations will result in different QoS in runtime. 
In addition, the service compositions occur dynamically in runtime and with the 
resource status of servers dynamically changing. Thus, allocating the resources of 
each server to its services for successfully satisfying the QoS requirements of 
dynamic multiple workflows and resource status is needed to satisfy the overall 
QoS requirements of the workflows in SBS. In practice, a service may create 
multiple service instances working for different workflows [83]. Two different 
service instances are considered as two different services. Although the 
functionalities of the multiple service instances are exactly the same, the amount 
of resource consumed by the service instances may vary depending on the 
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workflows and services they deployed in their servers. Hence, I will consider 
different service instances as different services. 
This section will present the challenges of adaptive resource allocation in 
SBS, and the current state of the art in handling dynamic resource allocation for 
various computing and network systems which are useful for dynamic resource 
allocation in SBS. I will then present an approach to adaptively allocating the 
system resources of servers to their services in runtime to satisfy one of the most 
important QoS requirements, the throughput, of multiple workflows in SBS.    
Development of QoS and resource management middleware has been 
studied in various areas, such as real-time systems, distributed object-oriented 
systems, web services, grid computing and SBS computing. A workflow-based 
computational resource broker [84, 85] was presented for grid computing 
environment. The main function of the resource broker is to monitor the available 
resources and match workflow requirements to available resources over multiple 
administrative domains. The resource broker provides a uniform interface for 
accessing available system resources of computing grid via users’ credentials. An 
open-source toolkit Globus has emerged as a standard middleware for resource 
management in grid computing environment [86]. Globus provides Web Service 
Grid Resource Allocation and Management (WS GRAM) Protocol in which a set 
of web services are designed to support APIs for requesting and using grid system 
resources. Globus also provides Monitoring and Discovery Service (MDS) that 
supports a common interface for collecting contextual information on system 
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resources, such as available processors, CPU load, network bandwidth, file 
system information, storage devices, and memory in computing grids.  
A market-based autonomic resource management approach in SBS 
computing environment was developed [87], in which Service-Level Agreement 
Resource Allocator provides the interfaces between the SBS service providers and 
external users/brokers for 1) monitoring users’ service requests and QoS 
requirements, 2) monitoring the availability of system resources, 3) examining 
service requests to determine whether to accept the requests according to resource 
availability and processing workload, 4) allocating system resources to virtual 
machines in SBS, 5) pricing the usage of resources and prioritizing the resource 
allocation, and 6) keeping track of the execution progress of the service requests 
and maintaining the actual usage of resources. This approach supports negotiation 
of QoS between users and providers to establish service-level agreements (SLA) 
and allocation of system resources to meet the SLAs. 
Multi-layered resource management (MLRM) architecture using standard-
based middleware technology [88] was developed for enterprise distributed real-
time embedded (DRE) systems. This architecture supports dynamic resource 
management to optimize and reconfigure system resources at runtime in response 
to changing mission needs and resource status. With the dynamic resource 
allocation, a DRE system can provide QoS for critical operations under the 
overloaded and resource constrained environments. In [89], a constraint-
programming-based approach was presented to solve resource allocation problem 
in real-time systems. The problem of assigning a set of preemptive real-time tasks 
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in a distributed system is formulated as a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) 
with allocation, resource and timing constraints. First, the CSP is solved using 
constraint programming techniques to satisfy the allocation and resource 
constraints. Then, the solution is validated for timing constraints through Logic-
based Benders decomposition [90].   
In [91], a decentralized local greedy mechanism for dynamic resource 
allocation in web service applications was presented.  In this mechanism, software 
agents are generated to buy and sell network services and resources to and from 
each other. In [92], a market based resource allocation for web services in a 
commercial environment was presented. In this approach, service providers 
employ a cluster of servers to host web services, and service consumers pay for 
service usage with QoS requirements, such as waiting time or response time. A 
framework was developed for evaluating the effect of particular resource 
allocation in terms of performance and average revenue earned per unit time. A 
heuristic algorithm was also developed for making resource allocation decisions 
in order to maximize revenue. 
The QoS of networks has been investigated for providing prioritized 
services by efficient resource allocation techniques through labeling, scheduling 
and routing mechanisms. In [93], an optimal resource allocation and pricing 
scheme for next generation multiclass networks was presented. In this scheme, an 
optimization problem is formulated based on a nonlinear pricing model, whose 
solution ensures satisfaction of network delay constraints and efficient resource 
allocation in dynamic multiservice networks. In [94], an energy-efficient radio 
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resource allocation approach based on game theory for wireless networks was 
presented. The study shows that the game-theoretic approach for resource 
allocation is useful for energy-constrained wireless networks. In [95], a resource 
allocation scheme for the wireless multimedia applications was presented. In this 
scheme, an optimization problem is formulated with fairness constraints for 
maximizing system capacity and resource utilization.  The solution of this 
problem yields the optimal allocation of sub-channel, path and power. A heuristic 
algorithm to solve the optimization problem was also presented to ensure that the 
adaptive resource allocation is performed efficiently in runtime. In [96], a 
resource allocation approach for embedded multimedia systems using 
heterogeneous multiprocessors was presented, in which optimal resources are 
allocated to each application to meet its throughput requirement. Synchronous 
Dataflow Graphs (SDFG) are used to model multimedia applications with time 
and resource constraints and to find the optimal resource allocation. 
QoS estimation according to the system activities and resource status has 
been studied in many ways. A QoS model of a router with feedback control that 
monitors the state of resource usage and adaptively adjusts parameters of traffic 
admission control to estimate QoS and resource utilization was presented in [97]. 
Batch Scheduled Admission Control (BSAC) method to predict service delay for 
high priority jobs in Internet-type networks was presented in [98]. A regression-
based model for dynamically provisioning resource demand to deliver given QoS 
expectation was presented in [99].  An adaptive model for the tradeoff between 
service performance and security in service-based environments was presented in 
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[100]. This model can be used to adjust security configurations to provide 
sufficient protection and satisfy service performance requirements with limited 
system resources. 
For adaptive resource allocation for QoS management in SBS, application 
level differentiated services [101, 102] were introduced to control QoS for 
different classes of service consumers. When the system resources are limited, 
fewer resources are allocated for normal consumers, and most resources are 
reserved for satisfying premium consumers’ expected QoS. Feedback controlled 
web services [103, 104] were developed to adjust QoS to meet the most important 
performance when resources are limited and consumers’ required performance 
cannot be fully satisfied. In [105], an integrated QoS management approach in 
SBS in order to satisfy users’ QoS requirements by providing differentiated 
system resources and priority of workflows was presented. In [106, 107], a 
general methodology for developing SBS with QoS monitoring and adaptation 
was introduced. This methodology supports monitoring of the changing system 
status, analysis and control of tradeoffs among multiple QoS features, and 
adapting its service configuration to satisfy multiple QoS requirements 
simultaneously. 
Existing resource allocation approaches cannot support dynamically 
changing runtime environments in SBS, such as workflow composition, QoS 
requirements, workflow priorities and resource status.  
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7.2 Overview of an Approach to Adaptive Resource Allocation for SBS  
This section presents a resource allocation approach to adaptively 
allocating the system resources of servers to their services in runtime in order to 
satisfy the throughput requirements of the multiple workflows in SBS.  
In SOA, a service that cannot be decomposed to smaller services and 
serves only one type of service-request is considered as an atomic service. All 
other services are considered as composite services. In order to have adaptive 
resource allocation capabilities in SBS, the SBS need to analyze the relationship 
between resource allocation of each server to its atomic services and the 
throughputs in both atomic and composite services provided by the server. In my 
approach, I first developed the Resource-Allocation-Throughput (RAT) model for 
an atomic service, and extend the model for the entire SBS to analyze the 
relationship between resource allocation and throughputs of the multiple 
workflows in SBS. The details of RAT model will be presented in Section 7.3. 
Based on the RAT model, I will present an algorithm to automatically formulate a 
linear programming optimization problem [108] to find the optimal resource 
allocation to serve the users’ service requests in Section 7.5. The definition of the 
optimal resource allocation is as follows: 
1) Optimal resource allocation will serve all the service requests of workflows in 
SBS until system resources are exhausted. 
2) If system resources are exhausted and all the service requests cannot be served, 
the optimal resource allocation will selectively serve the service requests to 
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maximize the throughput of SBS subject to the minimum throughput 
requirements and priorities of workflows. 
   The major distinction between resource allocation approach and other resource 
allocation approaches discussed before is that my approach can maximize 
utilization of limited system resources to reach maximum throughput according to 
dynamic workflow composition, throughput requirements, workflow priorities 
and resource status, rather than just serving users’ service-requests in first-in-first-
serve manner by matching available system resources upon the arrival of the user 
requests and requirements.  
The conceptual view of resource allocation approach is depicted in Figure 
10. Each rectangle represents a discrete system component. Functional details and 
relationships among the components are described as follows:  
 Workflow Manager dynamically creates workflows based on the users’ 
requests and available services. Automatic service discovery and composition 
can be done with semantic service description [109].  
 Workflow Monitor is responsible for gathering information about users’ 
service-request rates of each workflow from the Workflow Manager. The 
users’ service-request rates can be dynamically changed in runtime, and the 
monitoring of service-request rates is done periodically.  
 Resource Consumption Estimator is responsible for estimating the amount 
of resource to be consumed for executing service-requests of each workflow. 
The estimation is done based on the RAT model, which will be discussed in 
Section 7.3.  
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 Resource Monitor is responsible for collecting information about available 
resources of each server in SBS. The resource monitoring module for a large 
SBS can be built at the middleware layer, such as Ganglia [110] and Resource 
Broker [111, 112].  
 Resource Manager is responsible for finding an optimal resource allocation 
that maximizes the throughput of SBS with the constraints on the throughput 
requirements, available system resources, workflow orders, priorities, and 
service-request rates. In order to find the optimal resource allocation, I use 
linear programming (LP) for optimization of a linear objective function, 
subject to linear inequality constraints [113]. Detailed discussion on 
formulating linear programming optimization problem will be given in 
Section 7.5. Resource Manager is also responsible for adaptively allocating 
system resources of servers. The resource allocation can be dynamically done 
in runtime at the middleware layer, such as QoS Resource Manager [114] and 
Globus [115].  
 
   Figure 10: Conceptual View of Dynamic Adaptive Resource Allocation for SBS 
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The resource allocation to satisfy users’ throughput requirements can be 
determined as follows:  
An Approach to Dynamic Adaptive Resource Allocation in SBS 
Step1) (Initialization) Service providers, users, workflow manager, and resource 
monitors send the following information to the resource manager 
 Service Providers: the RAT model of each service in SBS.  
 Users: the throughput requirements for the workflows 
 Workflow Manager: the structure of each workflow, priority of each 
workflow, service request rate of each workflow 
 Each Resource Monitors of each server: the amount of available server 
resource 
Step2) (in run-time) The resource manager formulates a linear programming (LP) 
problem subject to the following constrains and objective: 
 Constraint 1) The throughput of a workflow cannot exceed the service-
request rate of the workflow 
 Constraint 2) The throughput of a workflow must satisfy the minimum 
throughput requirements specified by the user  
 Constraint 3) The total amount of resources consumed by all services in a 
server cannot exceed the amount of resources of the server 
 Objective) Allocating server resources to support services for maximizing 
the total throughput of all workflows in SBS 
The algorithms for formulating and solving the LP problem will be presented 
in Section 7.5. 
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Step3) Resource allocation is determined by solving the LP problem generated in 
Step2). Resource manager sends resource allocation command to each server in 
SBS. 
In this approach, the five challenges discussed in Section 1.2.2 are addressed 
as follows: the capability of situation awareness is provided by workflow manager, 
workflow monitor and resource monitor. Context analysis and QoS prediction are 
provided by resource consumption estimator. Resource adaptation in run-time is 
provided by resource manager. Efficiency and scalability of algorithms for 
formulating and solving a LP problem will be discussed in Section 7.6. 
 
7.3 RAT models For Atomic Services in SBS 
In this section, I will discuss RAT model for the relationship between 
system resource allocation of servers and the throughput of SBS. Before 
developing the RAT model of the entire SBS, it is needed to model the 
relationship between resource allocation of each server to its atomic services and 
the throughput of the atomic services.  
RAT model for an atomic service is shown in Figure 11. Limited system 
resources of a server are allocated to an atomic service. As service-requests arrive 
at the Service Request Queue, the atomic service creates multiple threads, which 
utilize the system resource to process the service-requests and send out the service 
responses. In this model, I consider the following five factors to estimate the 
amount of resource to be consumed by the atomic service for executing service-
requests: 
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 Service-request rate R of an atomic service: R is the average number of 
service-requests per second arriving at an atomic service, and represents the 
workload of the atomic service. An atomic service can limit the number of 
process threads and adaptively drop some service requests or put them into a 
waiting-queue according to the resource status of the atomic service in order 
to maintain a certain level of throughput.  
 Critical resource: Processing service-request will require various types of 
system resources of a server, such as CPU time, memory and network 
bandwidth. As R increases and more threads are created, one of the system 
resources of the server will become a bottleneck, and such system resource of 
the server is called the critical resource of the server. 
 Percentage of Allocated critical resource A: A is the percentage of allocated 
critical resource of a server to an atomic service provided by the server over 
the total available critical resource of the server. I only need to consider the 
allocation of the critical resource of a server because the critical resource of 
the server becomes a bottleneck first when other resources are sufficient. 
 Throughput P of an atomic service: P is defined as the average number of 
service responses per second of the atomic service. P is the sum of the service-
responses of each thread per second in an atomic service, and determined by 
the R and A of the atomic service. 
 Throughput requirement of a workflow: This is the minimum number of 
service responses per second required by the users for a workflow. 
From this model, notice that   
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1) P = R if A is not exhausted. In this case, P will be determined by R. 
2) Increasing R will increase P until allocated resource is exhausted. 
3) When A is exhausted, P will not increase even if R increases. Some of 
service-requests will be dropped or put into a waiting-queue. In this case, P 
will be determined by A. 
Based on the above observations, estimate the throughput P of an atomic service 
as follows: 
          P = R     when A is not exhausted    
             = α A   when A is exhausted 
where α is a proportional constant, which is different for different atomic services. 
Given the allocated critical resource A, αA is the maximum throughput of the 
atomic service. Define the service-cost of an atomic service as follows: 
Definition: The service cost of an atomic service is the percentage of critical 
resource required to serve a service-request over the total available critical 
resource.  
 
Figure 11: The RAT Model for an Atomic Service 
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It is noted that since P = αA when A is exhausted, the service cost of an 
atomic service is A / αA = 1/α. 
The critical resource type and the service cost of an atomic service can be 
estimated from the performance models for QoS related cause-effect dynamics in 
SBS, called Activity-State-Event-QoS (ASEQ) models [116, 117].  It is necessary 
for developing a general methodology for constructing the ASEQ models for SBS 
by conducting well-designed experiments in SBS and collecting data related to 
various users’ service-requests and system resource states. In this dissertation, I 
only need to consider the relationship between throughput and resource allocation 
since this research only considers the throughput. The service cost of an atomic 
service can be estimated as follows:  
S1) Allocate an arbitrary amount of critical resource A to a target atomic service. 
S2) Increase the R and measure the P of the atomic service until the critical 
resource of the server is exhausted. 
S3) Repeat S1) and S2) to obtain P with various A and R. 
S4) Using the statistical linear regression analysis on the  P  obtained in S3), 
estimate the service cost of the target atomic service 
 
7.4 RAT models For Composite Services in SBS 
SBS consists of multiple servers and workflows. Each server provides 
multiple atomic services, and each atomic service is represented by its service 
cost. Each workflow is composed of atomic services in different servers. Each 
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server has its critical resource and ability to adaptively allocate the critical 
resource to its atomic services in runtime.  
 
 
In practice, it may be impossible to satisfy all the users’ throughput 
requirements simultaneously because of limited system resources of servers. In 
this case, the system needs to relax the throughput requirements for some 
workflows. This can be done by setting priorities for workflows and allocate more 
resources to high-priority workflows when system resources are exhausted.  
Based on the relations among servers, atomic services and workflows, 
describe a SBS in BNF. From the RAT model of atomic service and the BNF of 
<SBS> ::= “(” {<Workflow>}+ , {<Server>}+  “)” 
<Server> ::= “(” <Server ID>, <Critical resource>,  < % of available critical 
resource>, 
                        {<Atomic service>}
+
 “)” 
<Atomic service> ::= “(” <Service ID>, <Service cost>  <Server ID> “)” 
<Workflow> ::= “(“ {<Service Composition>}+, <Service-request rate>, 
                                   <Throughput-requirement> <Priority> “)”  
<Starting> ::= <Atomic service> 
<Ending> ::= <Atomic service> 
<Service Composition> ::= <Sequence> | <Parallel Sprit> | <Merge> | 
<Pick> 
<Sequence> ::= “(” <Starting>, <Ending> “)” 
<Parallel Sprit> ::= “(” <Starting>, {<Ending>}+ “)” 
<Merge> ::= “(” {<Starting>}+, <Ending> “)” 
<Pick> ::= “(” <Starting>, <Condition>, {<Ending>}+ “)” 
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SBS, calculate the throughput of each workflow with given service-cost, 
percentage of allocated critical resource and service-request rate for each 
workflow as follows: 
Calculating throughput of a workflow in SBS 
1.  S = {s | s is an atomic service in a workflow} 
2.  For each s ∈ S 
3.     α = service-cost of s 
4.     R = service-request rate of s 
5.     A = Percentage of allocated critical resource to s 
6.     Let P(s) be the throughput of s 
7.     if (R ≤ A / α) then P(s) = R 
8.     else P(s) = A / α 
9.  Throughput of the workflow = MINIMUM s ∈ S (P(s))  
 
7.5 Resource allocation using RAT models and linear programming 
Based on the BNF of SBS and the RAT model of atomic service, 
formulate a constraint-optimization problem using linear programming. The 
solution of this optimization problem determines the amount of critical resource 
required for each atomic service. The following pseudo code shows algorithm to 
automatically formulate a linear programming optimization problem with given 
BNF of a SBS.  
 
  89 
Formulating a linear programming problem to allocate critical resources of all 
servers in a SBS 
1.  W = {w | w is a workflow in SBS} 
2.  Sv = {sv | sv is a server in SBS} 
3.  For each w ∈ W 
4.     Let throughput of w be TH(w) 
5.     Pr(w) = Priority of w 
5.     Add objective function of LP ( “Maximize  (TH w × Pr w ) w ∈ W ” ) 
6.     TR(w) = throughput-requirement of w  
7.     SR(w) = service-request rate of w 
8.     Add constraint (“TH(w) ≤ Service-request rate of w”) 
9.     If ( TR(w) ≤ SR(w) ) 
10.        Add constraint (“TH(w) ≥ TR(w)”) 
11.  For each sv ∈ Sv 
12.      For each w ∈ W 
13.        If w uses atomic services provided by sv 
14.           C = 0 
15.           For each atomic service s in sv used by w 
16.              α = service-cost of s 
17.              C = C + α×TH(w) 
18.       AR(sv) = % of available critical resource of sv 
19.       Add constraint (“C ≤ AR(sv)”) 
 
7.6 Adaptive Allocation of Critical Resources of Servers for SBS 
Using the Simplex algorithm [118], solve the linear programming problem 
presented in Section 7.5 and find the optimal throughput of each workflow in SBS. 
Given n workflows and m servers, this problem will have m variables and 2m+n 
constraints. Thus, the complexity of solving this problem is O(m3 + nm2) in the 
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worst case. On the average, these linear programming problems are solved in 
polynomial time [119]. Hence my approach addresses the challenge of efficiency 
and scalability discussed in Section 1.2.2.    
Once the throughput of each workflow is found, allocate the critical 
resource to each atomic service so that each workflow can produce its optimal 
throughput. The following pseudo code shows how to allocate the critical 
resources of servers to their atomic services. 
An algorithm for allocating critical resources of servers to their atomic services 
W = {w | w is a workflow in SBS} 
Sv = {sv | sv is a server in SBS} 
S = { s | s is an atomic service in Sv} 
Solve the LP problem using the Simplex algorithm and find optimal throughputs 
of workflows 
OT(w) = optimal throughput of workflow w ∈ W 
For each s ∈ S 
   α = service-cost of s 
   Let A(s) be the amount of critical resource to be allocated to s 
   A(s) = 0 
   For each workflow w that uses s 
      A(s) = A(s) + OT(w) × α 
 
7.7 A Demonstration of Adaptive Resource Allocation in SBS 
This section demonstrates resource allocation approach using a SBS shown in 
Figure 12 with four servers, nine atomic services and three workflows. The four 
servers were implemented as virtualized platforms using Hyper-V Manager 6.0. 
The configurations of the servers are as show in Table 5. 
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Figure 12: A SBS Demonstration System 
 
Table 5: Configurations of the Four Servers in Demonstration System 
Server Operating System CPU Memory 
Server 1 Windows Server 2003 0.7 GHZ 1024 MB 
Server 2 Windows Server 2003 2.94 GHZ 256 MB 
Server 3 Windows Server 2003 0.7 GHZ 1024 MB 
Server 4 Windows Server 2003 0.7 GHZ 1024 MB 
 
The nine atomic services were implemented as web services using C# 
Microsoft .NET framework. Using the RAT model of atomic service discussed in 
Section 7.3, the nine atomic services create threads to process runtime service 
requests from multiple users simultaneously. The atomic services are listed as 
follows: 
 Service 1 (Video Encoding Service): It takes 35 KB binary stream as input 
and converts it to AVI video format. 
 Service 2 (Data Compression Service): It takes 35 KB byte array as input and 
compresses the data using Data Compressing library provided by C#. 
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 Service 3 (DES Encryption Service): It takes any size of byte array as input 
and encrypts the data with key size 64 bits using DES Encryption library 
provided by C#. 
 Service 4 (AES128 Encryption Service): It takes any size of byte array as 
input and encrypts the data with key size 128 bits using AES Encryption 
library provided by C#. 
 Service 5 (AES256 Encryption Service): It takes any size of byte array as 
input and encrypts the data with key size 256 bits using AES Encryption 
library provided by C#. 
 Service 6 (DSA Digital Signature Service): It takes any size of byte array as 
input and produces digital signature with key size 1024 bits using DSA 
Digital Signature library provided by C# 
 Service 7 (MD5 Hashing Service): It takes any size of byte array as input and 
generates hash of the data using MD5 Hashing library provided by C#. 
 Service 8 (DSA Digital Signature Service): It takes any size of byte array as 
input and produces digital signature with key size 2048 bits using DSA 
Digital Signature library provided by C# 
 Service 9 (SHA1 Hashing Service): It takes any size of byte array as input 
and generates hash of the data using SHA1 Hashing library provided by C#. 
 
Besides these services, I also developed a throughput monitoring service with 
Windows Performance Objects which collects the throughput of each workflow 
and the resource consumption of each server in runtime. 
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To estimate the service cost of each atomic services, I ran one set of 
experiments. In each set of the experiments, I invoked its atomic service and 
increased service request rate until the system resource of the server was 
exhausted. The throughput of each atomic service using the throughput 
monitoring service is shown in Figure 13. The shapes of these curves are similar 
because the service response rates of the atomic services did not increase after the 
system resource of the server was exhausted even if the service request rates 
increased. 
 
 
Figure 13: The Throughput Threshold of Each of the Nine Atomic Services in 
Demonstration System 
 
The critical resource of the server of each atomic service is observed using the 
throughput monitoring service and shown in Table 6. Based on the experimental 
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results and the RAT model, I found the service cost of each atomic service using 
the process described in Section 7.3, which is shown in Table 7. 
Table 6: The Critical Resource of Each Server in Demonstration System 
Server Server 1 Server 2 Server 3 Server 4 
Critical Resource CPU Memory CPU CPU 
 
Table 7: The Service Cost of Each Atomic Service of Demonstration System 
Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Service 
Cost 
6.7% 2.1% 2.6% 2% 2.1% 2.94% 1.4% 2.17% 1.3% 
 
There are three workflows composed by the nine atomic services as shown in 
Figure 12. I ran two experiments on these workflows. In the first experiment, the 
workflows were executed without using resource allocation approach. In the 
second experiment, I ran the workflows with resource allocation approach. The 
service request rate of each workflow was set to 20 service requests/sec. The 
throughput requirements of workflow 1, workflow 2 and workflow 3 were set to 3, 
15 and 10 service responses/sec respectively. Based on the critical resource of 
each server from the throughput monitoring service and the estimated service cost 
of each atomic service, the BNF representation of the SBS is given below: 
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From the BNF representation of the SBS, the linear programming problem 
using the algorithm described in Section 7.5 is generated, shown as follows: 
<service1> = (<“service1”> <6.7%> <“server1”>) 
<service2> = (<“service2”> <2.1%> <“server1”>) 
<service3> = (<“service3”> <2.1%> <“server2”>) 
<service4> = (<“service4”> <2%> <“server2”>) 
<service5> = (<“service5”> <2.1%> <“server2”>) 
<service6> = (<“service6”> <2.94%> <“server3”>) 
<service7> = (<“service7”> <1.4%> <“server3”>) 
<service8> = (<“service8”> <2.17%> <“server4”>) 
<service9> = (<“service9”> <1.3%> <“server4”>) 
<Server1> = (<“server1”> <CPU> <100%> <service1> <service2>) 
<Server2> = 
(<“server2”><Memory><100%><service3><service4><service5>) 
<Server3> = (<“server3”> <CPU> <100%> <service6> <service7>) 
<Server4> = (<“server3”> <CPU> <100%> <service8> <service9>) 
<Sequence1> = (<service1><service3>) 
<Sequence2>=(<service3><service7>) 
<Sequence3> = (<service2><service4>) 
<Sequence4>=(<service4><service6>) 
<Sequence5> = (<service2><service5>) 
<Sequence6>=(<service5><service7>) 
<Sequence7>=(<service6><service8>) <Sequence8>=(<service7><service9>) 
<Workflow1>=((<Sequence1><Sequence2><Sequence8>)<30 /sec> <3 /sec> 
<1>) 
<Workflow2>=((<Sequence3><Sequence4><Sequence7>)<30 /sec><15 /sec> 
<1>) 
<Workflow3>=((<Sequence5><Sequence6><Seqiemce8>)<30 /sec><10 /sec> 
<1>) 
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After solving the linear programming problem, the throughputs for workflow 1, 
workflow 2 and workflow 3 were 3, 26.6 and 12.4 responses/sec, respectively. 
Then, I estimated the optimal resource allocation of the critical resource of each 
server using the resource allocation algorithm presented in Chapter 8, which is 
given in Table 8.  The throughputs of the three workflows of the two experiments 
are shown in Figure 14.  It is noted that there were significant differences in 
throughputs of the workflows between the two experiments.  It is also noted that 
the throughput requirements of workflow 2 and workflow 3 were not satisfied in 
the first experiment which was run without using resource allocation approach, 
but all the throughput requirements were satisfied in the second experiment using 
resource allocation approach, and that the overall throughput of the SBS, the sum 
of the throughputs of these three workflows increased by 28%. 
Table 8: Resource Allocation Results in the Demonstration System 
 CPU time of 
Server 1 
Memory Access time 
of Server 2 
CPU time of 
Server 3 
CPU time of 
Server 4 
Service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Optimal 
Resource 
Allocation 
21% 79% 15% 55% 27% 30% 70% 20% 80% 
 
Maximize p = TH1 + TH2 + TH3 Subject to 
TH1 <= 15, TH2 <= 15, TH3 <= 15, TH1 >= 3, TH2 >= 15, TH3 >= 10 
6.7TH1 + 2.1TH2 + 2.1TH3 <= 100 
2.6TH1 + 2 TH2 + 2.1 TH3 <= 100 
1.4TH1 + 2.94TH2 + 1.4TH3 <= 100 
2.17TH1 + 1.3TH2 + 1.3TH3 <= 100 
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Figure 14: The Throughputs of Workflows in Demonstration System 
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
8.1 Summary of Research Contributions 
In this dissertation, two interrelated problems of service-based systems 
(SBS) are addressed: protecting users’ data confidentiality from service providers, 
and managing performance of multiple workflows in SBS.  
To address the first problem, I have presented an approach to protecting 
the confidentiality of users’ data from unauthorized entities, including service 
providers of SBS. In this approach, users’ data confidentiality is protected by 
preventing the service providers from satisfying the following two conditions 
simultaneously: Condition 1) The service providers know where the users’ 
confidential data is located in SBS and have the privilege to access and collect the 
users’ confidential data in SBS, and Condition 2) The service providers 
understand the meaning of the users’ data. Data obfuscation techniques, 
anonymous service usage protocol (ASUP), and techniques for software module 
decomposition and distributed execution in SBS are developed in order to prevent 
the service providers from satisfying the two conditions simultaneously.   
To address the second problem, I have presented an approach to 
adaptively allocating system resources of servers in a SBS to their services in 
runtime in order to satisfy the performance requirements of multiple workflows in 
the SBS. This approach analyzes the relationship between resource allocations 
and performance of workflows in the SBS and then uses linear programming to 
determine resource allocation to satisfy users’ requirements on performance of 
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each workflow. My dynamic resource allocation approach has been demonstrated 
and shown to result in substantially increase the throughput of SBSs.  
  
8.2 Future Research 
In the approach to protecting the confidentiality of users’ data, the software 
service providers and infrastructure providers in SBSs are separated into different 
domains. From the business point of view, there are some complications or 
limitations on separating software providers and infrastructure providers required 
in my SBS architecture because most of current SBS service providers provide 
both software and infrastructure. It is desirable to investigate the economical 
impacts as well as possible changes of industry practices for adopting this SBS 
architecture.  
In my approach to software module decomposition and distributed execution, 
a requirement specification language to specify users’ data confidentiality 
requirements is developed. Currently, the specification language can be used only 
for specifying static data confidentiality requirements, in which the sensitivity of 
users’ data does not change in run-time. However, the sensitivity of users’ data 
may be dynamically changed in run-time due to changes in execution 
environments. Further research is needed to extend my requirement specification 
language to support specification of dynamic confidentiality requirements in run-
time. 
The anonymous service usage protocol (ASUP) developed for hiding users’ 
real identities in SBS only supports simple access control policies, such as 
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discretionary access control (DAC) policies.  Since the simple access control 
policies are solely based on the authentication of user’s identity, my ASUP cannot 
support systems requiring more powerful access control policies, such as 
mandatory access control (MAC) policies and role-based access control (RBAC) 
policies.   Further research is needed to extend ASUP to support more flexible and 
comprehensive access policies. 
Currently, my resource allocation approach is to improve the use of available 
resource to satisfy the performance of workflows. However, other QoS features, 
such as service delay, accuracy and jitter, may also important for the workflows 
of certain applications. Further research is needed to extend my resource 
allocation approach to supporting multiple QoS features.   
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